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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1942-1943*
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS

D ESPITE

the frequent criticisms of the rationale for such
a view, the Illinois courts continue to adhere rigidly to
the doctrine that a charitable corporation cannot be held
liable for the negligence of its agents, even though the corporation may have obtained public liability insurance to
protect it from any loss which might arise thereby,1 or has
been paid by the injured party for its services.2 Repudiated
in England' and losing ground in this country,4 it is to be
hoped that the incorporated charity which "does good in the
wrong way" 5 may yet be called to account.
Scattered through the provisions of the Illinois Business
Corporations Act appears the statement that changes in corporate structure, registered office, registered agent and the
like shall become effective "upon the filing of such statement
by the Secretary of State,"' although the statute also pro* The present survey is not intended in any sense as a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past
year, but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention merely to cases
and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is
that of the judicial year, embracing from 380 Il. 1 to 383 Il. 300; from 314 l.
App. 574 to 319 Ill. App. 255; and from 127 F. (2d) 864 to 135 F. (2d) 632.
1 Myers v. Young Men's Christian Assoc. of Quincy, 316 Ill. App. 177, 44 N.E.
(2d) 755 (1942), noted in 21 CHIcAGo-KNT LAW REVIEw 256, 10 U of Chi.
L. Rev. 211.
2 Saffron v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Chicago, 317 Ill. App. 149, 45 N.E.
(2d) 555 (1942), abstract opinion, noted in 27 Marq. L. Rev. 164.
8 Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibb, 11 H.L.Cas. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866).
4 See the exhaustive treatment of the subject by Rutledge, J., now Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, in President and Dir. of Georgetown College v.
Hughes, 130 F. (2d) 810 (1942), particularly pp. 817-22.
5 130 F. (2d) 810 at 828.
6 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §157.12.
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vides that the duplicate original of the document in question
should subsequently be recorded in the appropriate county.7
While the statutory language would seem to resolve any
doubts on the subject, it was held in In re National Mills,
Inc.," that any such change is ineffective as to third persons
until notoriety is given to that fact by both filing with the
Secretary of State and also by recording. A corporate chattel
mortgage executed and recorded in the county in which the
corporation maintained its registered office was, therefore,
deemed valid even though, prior to execution, the corporation had filed notice of change of registered office with the
Secretary of State, since recording of the notice of change
did not occur until after the chattel mortgagee's rights had
otherwise been established.9
The business of selling corporate securities in Illinois has
long been subject to the provisions of the so-called "Blue
Sky" Act," under which the seller of Class D securities, sold
in violation of the provisions thereof, may be compelled to
reimburse the purchaser for the price paid." The adoption
of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 193412 inevitably
produced the question as to whether or not the federal
statute superseded the several state laws governing security
distribution, 13 but it was decided in Crosby v. Weil, 4 at
least so far as intrastate sales are concerned, that the more
stringent provisions of the local statute had not been superseded. The fact that the securities were delivered by United
States mail was held insufficient to convert the transaction
into one of interstate commerce.
See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §157.15.
(2d) 604 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGO
KENT LAw REV=w 259.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 95, §4, requires that the chattel mortgage, to possess
validity against creditors, must be recorded with the recorder of the county "in
which the mortgagor shall reside at the time when the instrument is executed
and recorded."
A subsequent removal does not affect the lien thus acquired:
Haugens v. Holmes, 314 Ill. App. 166, 41 N.E. (2d) 109 (1942).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121 , §96 et seq.
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121 , §132(1).
12 15 U. S. C. A. §§78a-78jj.
13 U. S. Constitution, Art. VI, states: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the . . . Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."
7

s Sub nom. VanAusdall v. McCanon, 133 F.

14

382 III. 538, 48 N.E. (2d) 386 (1943).
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Upon the insolvency of a corporation and the appointment of a receiver, confusion is likely to arise over the question of whether such receiver becomes vested with title to
the corporate assets including choses in action or is merely
the custodian thereof for the purpose of collecting the proceeds. If he is a general equity receiver, title to such claims
remains in the corporation 5 hence actions thereon should
be brought in the corporate name, and derivative suits to
enforce such claims may be, under proper circumstances,
conducted by the shareholders. It was held in McIlvaine v.
City National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago," however, that a receiver of an insolvent state bank appointed by
the Auditor of Public Accounts pursuant to Section 11 of the
Banking Act 1 7 acquires title to the assets thereof, including all causes of action belonging to the banking corporation,
hence a representative suit by a shareholder to enforce a
claim for good will, transferred prior to insolvency supposedly without consideration, was deemed improper. The court
indicated that if such litigation were to be permitted, it could
only be allowed after demand upon the Auditor to direct the
receiver to bring suit and his failure or refusal so to do. A
claim that Section 11 was unconstitutional as depriving the
shareholder of a property right without due process 18 was
likewise rejected on the ground that the power to maintain
a derivative suit was a privilege accorded to prevent a failure
of justice rather than a property right.
While it had been held that an Illinois corporation, dissolved for failure to comply with statutory requirements,
could not file a voluntary petition for reorganization in the
federal courts, 19 the issue presented in In re Peer Manor
Building Corporation20 was novel. It appeared therein that
a plan of extension had been worked out in 1937 under Sec15 Farwell v. Great Western Tel. Co., 161 Ill. 522, 44 N.E. 891 (1896); Heffron v.
Gage, 149 Ill. 182, 36 N.E. 569 (1894).
16 314 Ill. App. 496, 42 N.E. (2d) 93 (1942), cause transferred 371 IIl. 565, 21 N.E.
(2d) 737 (1939).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16 , §11.
18 In Golden v. Cervenka, 278 Il1. 409, 116 N.E. 273 (1917), such a claim had
been sustained as to creditors of an insolvent bank.
19 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Forty-one Thirty-six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120,
58 S. Ct. 125, 82 L. Ed. 147 (1937).
20 Sub nom. Witter v. Nikolas, 134 F. (2d) 839 (1943). Evans, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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tion 77B of the Bankruptcy Act 2 extending the maturity
date of the corporate indebtedness until 1941. Upon default
under the plan, the indenture trustee filed an involuntary
petition for reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.2 2 One of the bondholders objected to such petition on the ground that corporate existence had been ended
by decree over seven years prior thereto, hence there was
no organization available to be reorganized. The majority
of the court, following the earlier view, held that since more
than two years had elapsed from the date of the decree" the
corporation was defunct for all purposes and hence reorganization proceedings were improper. The dissenting judge,
however, felt that the earlier decision was controlling only
as to voluntary proceedings and that the rights of corporate
creditors should not be barred by the failure of the corporate
officials to preserve corporate existence. If the decree of
dissolution could not be vacated, the use of foreclosure proceedings would seem to be the only way out of the impasse.2 4
Though the record owner of shares in an insolvent bank
is, without question, subject to the superadded constitutional
liability some doubt has been expressed as to the liability
of one who held shares in a holding company owning such
bank stock,2 5 or who was the beneficial owner thereof but
did not appear as a holder of record. Recovery against the
former was denied in Joseph v. Bates2 where it appeared
the holding company shareholder held such stock merely as
the nominee for another, but was granted in Reconstruction
Finance Corporation v. Barrett2' against the beneficial
owner whose connection with the closed bank did not appear
of record but had to be deduced from extrinsic facts. The
latter's claim that suit and judgment against the record
owner, followed by compromise thereof, operated as a bar
21 11
22

U. S. C. A. § 207.

11 U. S. C. A. § 501 et seq.

IMI.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, § 157.94.
On this point see Markus v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 373 Ill. 557, 27 N.E.
(2d) 463 (1940).
25 See Flanagan v. Madison Square State Bank, 302 Ill. App. 468, 24 N.E. (2d)
202 (1939). See also McClanahan, Bank Stock Liability and the Holding Company
Device, 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 160 (1941).
26 133 F. (2d) 457 (1943). Evans, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
27 131 F. (2d) 745 (1942).
23
24
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was rejected on the theory that the liabilities were separate
though only one satisfaction would be permitted.
But slight amendment has been made to the Business
Corporation Act by the Sixty-third General Assembly. Such
alteration as has occurred deals with license fees payable by
foreign corporations permitted to do business in this state 2
or the right of merger or consolidation between domestic
and foreign corporations. 29 A wholly new statutory regulation has, however, been devised for currency exchanges,3 0
while the former act dealing with corporations not for profit
has been replaced with an entirely new code 1 which is expressly made applicable to existing corporations of that
32
character.
PARTNERSHIP

Mining partnerships are not at all new in Illinois, but
litigated cases involving them are infrequent. In the case of
Kinne v. Duncan,3 the court found that a mining partnership arose when Duncan, owner of an oil lease, assigned a
one-half interest therein to one Borton upon the understanding that the lease should be developed with Duncan doing
the drilling. Subsequently Borton assigned his interest to
others, and they, as well as Duncan, set aside specified sums
of money in "oil runs" to certain finance companies. Later,
Duncan filed a claim for an oil and gas lien pursuant to
statute 34 and also asserted a like lien against the interests
of the other persons holding interests under the lease on the
theory that the arrangement constituted a mining partnership. His contention was sustained, the court using the language of Harris v. Young3 5 in summing up the relationship.
A further controversy therein involved the rights of the
several partners to a lien on the total amount of oil produced.
It was claimed that certain "division" orders, both as to
Duncan's share of the oil produced and others given to fiLaws 1943, p.-, H.B.No. 181; III. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §§ 157.135-6.
Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 779; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, § 157.69a.
30 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B.No. 475; Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 161/, § 31 et seq.
31 Laws 1943, p.-, S.B.No. 335; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, H§ 163al-163a100.
32 Laws 1943, p.-, S.B.No. 335, § 3; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §163a2.
33 383 Ill. 110, 48 N.E. (2d) 375 (1943), modifying 315 Ill. App. 577, 43 N.E. (2d)
425 (1942).
84 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 82, § 71 et seq.
35 298 IM. 319, 131 N.E. 670 (1921).
28
29
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nance companies as repayment of loans, constituted a division of the property or the product so that each partner
owned his share in severalty, hence no partnership lien could
attach upon either the property or the product actually divided. The court, however, found that the "division" orders
were a temporary device, so that, when Duncan asserted his
lien and the court appointed a receiver, the division stopped
and the proceeds again became the joint property of the
partners. The construction liens of material men who had
worked at Duncan's request were, however, given priority.
LABOR LAW

The labor cases decided by the Illinois courts during the
period covered by this survey have dealt largely with internal union matters rather than with the employer-employee
relationship. In Fichterv. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local
753,36 for example, there was involved the right of a union
member to disability benefits under the union by-laws.
Fichter had become a member of the union in 1922. In 1928
he sustained a permanent injury as the result of an accident
which occurred while he was driving a milk wagon on duty.
At that time the by-laws of the defendant union provided
that: "A sick benefit shall be paid to members in good standing of twenty dollars ($20.00) per week . . . As soon as 90
days of benefit has been paid a member, if he is still sick
his dues stop and he draws two ($2.00) dollars per week
extra for his wife and each child under 16 years. ' 37 There
was no time limitation on the payments. In 1935 the union
amended its by-laws by which payments to a wife and minor
child were omitted and the number of weekly benefits to any
one member was limited. When this by-law became effective, the union notified plaintiff that they would carry him
for ninety-two additional weeks at twenty dollars per week
instead of the amount he had been receiving. Plaintiff made
no reply to the notice but accepted the money tendered.
After the termination of that period he filed suit alleging
that under the earlier by-laws he was entitled to receive the
larger payment indefinitely and that the amendment was
91, 46 N.E. (2d) 921 (1943), reversing 312 Ill.App. 40, 37 N.E. (2d)
36 382 Ill.
919 (1941).
91 at 93, 46 N.E. (2d) 921 at 922.
37 382 fli.
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not binding on him. Characterizing the action of the union as
"repudiation pure and simple," 8 the court held that once
Fichter's rights had become vested, the change in the bylaws could not affect those rights. The acceptance of the
lesser sum during the ninety-two week period was held not
union since
to operate to cancel the original obligation of3 the
9
the acceptance was without consideration.
Applying the same tests as are applied to insurance company cases and other cases of like nature, the court in Tesk
v. Sagerstrom ° held that a union which had accepted dues
payments regularly, although paid after the due date, could
not take the position that a member who was fully paid up
at the time of his death was not a member in good standing.
It consequently held that the member's widow was entitled
to full death benefits under the union by-laws in spite of the
fact that one of the by-laws provided such benefits would
be paid only if the member had been "continuously in good
standing" through prompt payment of dues for one year
previous to death, which was not the case here.
Specific performance of an agreement as to seniority
rights was denied in Carver v. Brien4 because the employer
was not a party to the agreement and had not evidenced its
position thereon. 42 The agreement had been made by the
union employees working in the yard shops of three separate railroads. As a result of an operational consolidation,
all of the work of one railroad shop and most of that of the
second had been transferred to the third. An attempt to preserve seniority rights by dovetailing was contemplated by
the agreement. With specific performance denied, the plaintiffs were thus left to their action for damages, which may
be more illusory than real.
Because Almon v. American Carloading Corporation"
38

382 Ill.
91 at 95, 46 N.E. (2d) 921 at 923.

626, 18 N.E. 322, 1
L. R. A. 303 (1888).
App. 231, 46 N.E. (2d) 131 (1942).
40 317 Ill.
App. 643, 43 N.E. (2d) 597 (1942), noted in 37 ll. L. Rev. 456.
41 315 Ill.
42 As to the other employees involved in the transfer, the railroad involved had
put the consolidated rosters into effect as soon as they were agreed upon by the
parties, hence there seems to be little justification for the court's position on this
point.
43 312 Ill.App. 225, 38 N.E. (2d) 362 (1941), noted in 21 CHIcAGco-KENT LAW
REVIEw 10.
39 See Hayes v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 125 11.
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was reversed by the Supreme Court on another ground, 4
the Appellate Court's statement therein that a union is a
legal entity lost much of its original force. However, the
proposition was restated by the same court in Maywood
Farms Company v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago,
Local 753.45 The court said it was error not to hold the union,
along with certain of its officials, on an order to show cause
why it should not be held in contempt for violating an injunction against it. The roots are thus spreading. In the
same case, the recognized principle4 6 that extreme violence
may justify an injunction prohibiting all picketing, in spite
of the protection afforded to free speech by the federal constitution,4 7 was applied where the violence had even included
shooting.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

In the case of Hilberg v. Industrial Commission s the
Supreme Court had occasion to construe the 1939 amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act4 9 dealing with the
time within which claims for compensation should be filed.
The court there held that the phrase "within one year" referred to the year in which the employee could file an application for compensation for the injury, and that the
amendment was designed to make specific the time beyond
which the employer would not be liable for death resulting
from an accident.5" To accomplish that intent, it was held
that the act must mean that death resulting from accident
must occur within one year from the date of the accident or
44 380 Il.

524, 44 N.E. (2d) 592 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 186.
316 Ill. App. 47, 43 N.E. (2d) 700 (1942).
46 See Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,
61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836 (1941).
47 See American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85
L. Ed. 855 (1941), and related cases.
48 380 Ill. 102, 43 N.E. (2d) 671 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 204.
49 Laws 1939, p. 601; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 161, which reads in part:
"Provided, that in any case, unless application for compensation Is filed with the
Industrial Commission within one year after the date of the accident, where no
compensation has been paid, or within one year after the date of the last payment
of compensation, where any has been paid, the right to file such application shall
be barred; Provided, further, that if the accidental injury results in death within
said year, application for compensation for death may be Ifiled with the Industrial Commission within one year after the date of death, but not thereafter."
50 The earlier view is illustrated by Burke v. Industrial Commission, 368 Ill.
554, 15 N.E. (2d) 305, 119 A. L. R. 1152 (1938).
45
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from the date of the last payment of compensation and that
application for compensation must be made within one year
from the date of death.
A case involving the meaning of "arising out of" employment and also of "special hazard" was furnished in
Permanent Construction Company v. Industrial Commission5' wherein the Supreme Court, on the special facts
thereof, enlarged the employer's liability beyond previous
Illinois decisions. It appeared therein that employees of the
construction company were engaged in working on certain
hospital grounds and were supplied with drinking water from
a single water tap connected with the hospital waterworks
system. These employees contracted typhoid fever when consuming contaminated water thus furnished. Liability of the
employer was predicated upon the fact that the employer
hired water boys who brought the water in buckets from
the tap to the workmen. Had the water not been so carried,
but had the workmen gone individually to the only water tap
on the grounds and drank therefrom, it is submitted that the
causative danger would have been one common to the neighborhood, hence the employer should not have been held. By
supplying the water in the fashion presented, it was, however, held that the employer had created a special hazard
for which liability attached.
Of special importance is the case of Thomson v. Industrial Commission5 2 where a watchman-employee of an interstate railroad, guarding and inspecting both interstate and
intrastate cars, was severely injured by trespassers upon
the employer's property. The Supreme Court held that he
was entitled to compensation under the Illinois statute, despite the contention of the employer that the injured employee was comprehended within and subject to the
provisions of the federal Employer's Liability Act, as
amended in 1939, which would have excluded him from the
operation of the state act.5 3 The opinion recognizes that in
recent years the power of Congress to regulate industry,
for the purpose of furthering interstate commerce, has been
51 380 IRl. 47, 43 N.E. (2d) 557 (1942), noted in 28 Wash. U. L. Q. 49.
52 380 IM. 386, 44 N.E. (2d) 19 (1942), noted in 43 Col. L. Rev. 139.
53 45 U. S. C. A. § 51.
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greatly extended by judicial construction. But, said Justice
Smith, "The extension of Federal control has not, however,
destroyed the constitutional limitations on the power of Congress . . . Congress is still powerless to regulate matters
which are wholly intrastate." 54 The court then proceeded to
point out that the activity of the employee at the time of the
injury was purely local, that the watchman was engaged in
the prevention of a simple trespass on the right of way, and
that his attempt to eject the trespassers did not closely or
substantially affect interstate commerce. The decision,
therefore, depends strongly upon this factual conclusion.
Constitutional issues involved in the case are discussed elsewhere in this survey.
II. CONTRACTS

Three cases involving general principles of contract law
decided during the past year are worthy of mention. Perhaps
the most interesting of these was the decision in Glenn v.
McDavid.1 The court there held that a claim might be allowed against the estate of a decedent, although the debt
upon which the claim was based was barred by the statute
of limitations, where the sole heir made a written promise
to pay the debt. The case is novel in view of the fact that the
decision necessarily involves a holding that the heir himself
became liable by virtue of his promise. Apparently the only
consideration for the promise was a moral obligation, and
the moral obligation therein was not one which originally
had been a legal one.2
The Supreme Court in the case of Soelzer v. Soelzer
passed upon the enforceability of an agreement to adopt. In
this case the child was obtained from a foundling home and
a formal written "Agreement of Adoption" was executed by
the home but not by the adopting parents. The child was
received into the home and was treated as a daughter by
the adopting parents. The Supreme Court held that the principle, applicable to contracts generally, that a party may
54 380 IMI.386 at 392, 44 N.E. (2d) 19 at 22.
1 316 Ill. App. 130, 44 N.E. (2d) 84 (1942).
2 A more complete discussion of this case appears in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVMW 188.
393, 47 N.E. (2d) 458 (1943).
3 382 Ill.
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become bound by a written contract through his conduct
even though he had not signed it, is applicable to contracts
to adopt. Specific performance of the contract was granted,
in the sense that the child was decreed to be an heir of the
adopting parents.4
A third decision worth noting is that of the Circuit Court
of Appeals in Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 5 in which it appeared that Roe, an attorney, had been employed by defendant to recover federal floor and processing taxes. Roe's
compensation was entirely contingent upon his success in
recovering the taxes paid. He died two years before the
statute imposing the taxes was declared unconstitutional. In
view of the fact that the defendant subsequently recovered
large sums of money, the court held that his representative
was entitled to judgment. The decision seems extraordinary
since the suit was based upon the contract and was not
merely a claim for the fair value of services rendered. The
result appears to do violence to the "entire contract" rule.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

While it is generally well settled, and perhaps particularly so in Illinois, 7 that a reference to security contained in
a negotiable instrument will not destroy its negotiability,
nevertheless the decision in Abingdon Bank & Trust Company v.. Shipplett-Moloney Company" seems to expand the
possibility of comprehensive reference without damaging the
aspect of negotiability. The occasion for the opinion was the
determination of the negotiability of a note which is here
given in full. 9 Both parties to the litigation came to issue
upon two questions, one as to certainty of time of payment
4

See Winkelmann v. Winkelmann, 345 Ill.566, 178 N.E. 118 (1931),

and note

thereon in 11 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEw 307.
5 132 F. (2d) 829 (1943).
6 Since the trial court had ruled against the plaintiff on motion for summary
judgment, the case was sent back for trial. Other issues which might become
important on a trial of the case are discussed in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 337.
158, 56 N.E. 297 (1900); Read v. Kerr, 249 Ill. App.
7 Hunter v. Clarke, 184 Ill.
493 (1928).
8 316 Ill. App. 79, 43 N.E. (2d) 857 (1942).
9 The note in question read in part as follows:
May 1, 1926
Abingdon, Illinois
"$700.00
One yr. four months after date for value received, I (we) promise to pay to
Shipplett-Moloney Co., or order Seven Hundred Dollars at the First National Bank,
Abingdon, Illinois, with interest at seven per cent per annum from date until paid.
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and one as to certainty of amount, but ultimately stood on
the latter point. It was urged that, by reason of paragraph
two of the note containing an option under the "insecurity"
clause, the amount which might be sued for was not stated
and therefore extrinsic evidence would be required to determine the sum due. The court, however, pointed out that
reference to the "balance remaining unpaid" in such paragraph could have no effect upon the amount of the promise
in, or the amount unpaid on, the note as sued upon. Although
the note could be put in default by the exercise of the option,
thereby accelerating maturity, such act would in no way
change or make uncertain the amount promised to be paid
or the amount due and unpaid at the time of suit. The amount
promised to be paid was fixed by the instrument, hence it
was negotiable. The further reference to a second note would,
in no way, affect the court's conclusion. While the case is
perhaps only a repetition of what has been said before, the
recitals in the second paragraph did, apparently, seem to
the losing litigant to provide for more apparent uncertainty
than usually appears in notes of this character.
Reference is made elsewhere"° to the decision in Joseph
v. Carter" dealing with the question of reviving the obligation of a negotiable instrument otherwise barred by the
statute of limitations. A statement in the note permitting the
holder bank "to apply . . all property . . . of the undersigned" toward the satisfaction thereof was held insufficient
to revive the husband's debt, even though, within the statu"This note (with 1 others) is given for John Deere Tractor and I hereby agree
that title thereto, and to all repairs and extra parts furnished therefor, shall remain in the payee, owner or holder of this note until this and all other notes given
therefor shall have been paid in money. If at any time he shall deem himself
insecure, or if said property or any part thereof is levied upon, or the undersigned
attempts to sell or remove the same, then the owner or holder hereof may declare
this and every other such note due, and may take possession of said property,
and sell the same at public or private sale, with or without notice, pay all expenses incurred thereby and apply the net proceeds on this and other notes given
for the purchase price thereof. In consideration of the use of said property, I
agree to pay any balance remaining unpaid on this or any other such note after
the net proceeds of such sale are applied, and if said property, or any part
thereof, shall be lost, damaged or destroyed I shall not on that account be entitled
to a rescission of this contract or abatement in price.
10 See post, p. 42.
11 382 Ill. 461, 47 N.E. (2d) 471 (1943), reversing 314 Ill. App. 630, 42 N.E. (2d)
321 (1942).
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tory period, the payee did apply property of the wife, comaker of the note, toward partial satisfaction.
One slight change in the Negotiable Instruments Act was
made during the recent session. It permits the drawee bank
to which a check is presented to wait until the end of the
next business day following the day of presentation before
deciding whether or not to pay the same."2
SALES

Of novelty only from a factual point of view is the case
of Jones v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corporation.3 The
court there held that, by reason of a conditional sales contract, title to certain casing pipe for lining an oil well remained in the seller even though the piping had been imbedded and cemented into the hole of an oil well with one
hundred sacks of cement! Default by the vendee in payment
of the note, particularly since the same contained a clear
provision entitling the vendor to enter the premises and remove the property, was held to justify the vendor's conduct
in so doing. Although the vendor had to blast the well in
order to regain the property, it was held still to be within
the right conferred by the conditional sales contract.
Construction and application was given to the Illinois
Bulk Sales Act 4 in the federal court decision in United
States v. Goldblatt Brothers, Incorporated.5 It appeared
therein that, at the time the vendee purchased a business in
bulk, the vendor furnished a list of creditors, all of whom
were properly notified. Omitted from the list of creditors
was the United States government to whom vendor owed
certain income and social security taxes. The vendee was
aware of the probable federal tax liability but gave no notice
to the government on the theory it was not a creditor of the
class contemplated by the statute. In upholding the claim
of the government, the federal court held that the language
of the Illinois act was sufficiently broad to include creditors
of every class without limitation and was not restricted to
Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 744; IMl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 98, § 207a.
13 381 IMl. 615, 46 N.E. (2d) 67 (1943), reversing 313 Ill. App. 651, 40 N.E. (2d)
12

561 (1942).
14 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121 , § 78 et seq.
15 128 F. (2d) 576 (1942). Major, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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those whose claims were liquidated as to amount. Dissent
was noted 6 on the ground that the tax claim was contingent
and unliquidated until assessment was made upon a return
not due until the 15th of March following the sale, hence the
liability could not be said to be an "amount owing" as that
term was used in the statute." It would seem that there is
merit in such contention.
QUASI CONTRACTS

One case decided during the past year raised an interesting question concerning the nature of quasi contractual
liability. 8 It appeared therein that one Hancock, a civil
engineer, rendered professional services to the defendant
village in connection with the proposed construction of a
sewerage system. The proposed improvement was to be
made pursuant to the statutory authority of Section 62 of the
Cities and Villages Act. 19 The statute provided for referendum to the voters if a petition was filed in apt time. The
vote taken was adverse to the proposed plan and the village
therefore abandoned it. Hancock then sought to recover the
fair and reasonable value of his services. The village defended on the ground that its debt liability already exceeded
the constitutional limitation of five per cent. of the value of
the taxable property, 20 hence the contract under which
Hancock claimed was illegal. Plaintiff insisted that, since
the liability of the village did not arise out of contract but
was based on an obligation to make restitution imposed by
law, it was not within the constitutional limitation. The court
distinguished contract, tort, and quasi contractual liability
and held that although Hancock's claim did not arise out of
contract it was not involuntary as would be the case of tort
liability, hence recovery was denied. The decision follows
that of the Supreme Court of the United States in City of
Litchfield v. Ballou.2 1 The result seems justified in view of
16 In support thereof, the dissenting judge cited Superior Plating Works v. Art
Metal Crafts Co., 218 Il. App. 148 (1920); Lawndale S. & D. Co. v. West Side
T. & S. Bk, 207 Ill. App. 3 (1917).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121 , § 78.
18 Hancock v. Village of Hazel Crest, 318 IMI. App. 170, 47 N.E. (2d) 557 (1943).
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, §§ 62-1 to 62-12.
20 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 12.
21 114 U. S. 190, 5 S. Ct. 820, 29 L. Ed. 132 (1885).
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the public policy involved in the imposition of debt limitations upon municipal corporations such as the one here in
question.
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

As is usually the case, much of the work of the courts of
review during the current period has been concerned with
procedural questions. Cases which do not involve some issue
of practice or procedure are rare, yet many of the questions
presented may be dismissed as being trite from long application of the principle of stare decisis. Those cases which
present some novelty in procedural law are here summarized and presented in roughly the same order as would be
followed by a lawyer presenting his client's case.
REMEDIES AT LAW

The surprising decision in Werner v. Illinois Central
Railroad Company,' which limited the city courts to the
trial of civil causes arising in the city, apparently motivated
the legislature to amend the statute fixing the jurisdiction
of such courts.2 They are now declared to possess true concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts, even to the point
of trying felony cases which may be certified to them for
disposition. They have also been given jurisdiction over petitions, by residents, for change of name.'
Comment is made elsewhere4 of an unsuccessful attempt
to make the former action of trover available to recover
damages for the appropriation of a list of customers' names
and addresses. The expansion of existing legal remedies
was deemed not to be within the province of the courts at
this late date, even though such remedies had been originally developed there. The scope of judicial action in statutory proceedings, however, may be as broad or as narrow
as the legislature may fix, within constitutional limits. In the
case of proceedings to revoke a license granted under the
Dental Practice Act, 5 the court's power is expressly ex1 379 Ill. 559, 42 N.E. (2d) 82 (1942), reversing 309 Ill. App. 292, 33 N.E. (2d) 121
(1941), noted in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvizw 116.
2 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 471; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 37, § 333.
s Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 106; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 96, § 1.
4 See post, p. 74.
5 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 91, § 58-72c.
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tended to cover review of questions of law or fact 6 subject
to the limitation that such questions be adequately preserved
by a motion for rehearing filed with the administrative body.
Since the scope of this statutory certiorari proceeding is
quite broad, the Supreme Court held in Dubin v. Department
of Registration and Education7 that the trial court must indicate, in its judgment, some one or more of the grounds
assigned in such motion as the basis for quashing the writ
or the return thereon. This was deemed essential as otherwise jurisdiction might appear to be lacking, since without
this it could seem as though the trial court passed on the
matter by way of trial de novo, a method clearly not
intended.
REMEDIES IN

EQUITY

Two of the three cases on the use of equitable remedies
deemed important to mention in this year's survey merely
reinforce traditional views on frequently recurring problems. A persistent effort has been made through the years
to induce the courts to extend the remedy of injunction to
cases of libel and slander. A steadfast refusal has been the
result in most states where the situation is unaffected by
statutory provisions. In Gariepy v. Springer' the plaintiff,
a lawyer, sought relief against the circulation of allegedly
false and scandalous matter which he claimed defendant
was sending to plaintiff's clients, friends, and associates.
The complaint alleged malice and that the acts of the defendant were directly and seriously injurious to the plaintiff's practice. The Appellate Court held that equity would
not enjoin the threatened publication of a libel, except in
cases involving conspiracy, intimidation or coercion.9 The
case does not discuss the basis for these exceptions but relies upon the authoritative texts for the rule. The rule has
been said to be founded on traditional views as to freedom
of speech and the desirability of having a jury determine
the issues in these cases.' 0 The unfortunate fact is that the
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 91, S 62f.
380 Ill. 57, 43 N.E. (2d) 554 (1942).
8 318 Ill. App. 523, 48 N.E. (2d) 572 (1943).
9 See National Life Ins. Co. of the U. S. v. Myers, 140 IMl. App. 392 (1908).
10 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29
Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1916).
7
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remedy at law in libel and slander cases is usually grossly
inadequate. This consideration raises the question whether
a careful weighing of values might not indicate the desirability of relaxing so strict a rule in some cases.
The problems arising out of the attempted use of equitable remedies to enforce the criminal law were considered by
the Appellate Court in People ex rel. Barrett v. Fritz." In
this case the Attorney General filed a complaint against
more than thirteen hundred persons who were allegedly violating the gambling laws of the state in various ways. Injunctive relief was asked against three groups of defendants,
to-wit: persons who were associated with horse-racing in
various ways; persons who operated gambling houses and
establishments; and persons who operated slot machines
and similar devices. The complaint was filed in the Circuit
Court of St. Clair County but the defendants named in the
first two groups were drawn from all parts of the state. The
activities of these defendants were alleged to constitute public nuisances. The chancellor granted injunctive relief, but
this decree was reversed and the cause was remanded with
directions to dismiss the complaint. The Appellate Court remarked that the Civil Practice Act had not abolished underlying principles of equity practice, but instead had recognized
marked divisions between law and equity. The "public
nuisance" theory could not support a decree, since it was
merely the activities of the several defendants and not the
use of specific property which was involved. Moreover, the
complaint was held to be multifarious inasmuch as no conspiracy was alleged to exist between the various classes of
defendants.
The court also relied upon the old principle that equity
will not take jurisdiction to enforce the criminal law. It may
enjoin where the fact that the acts threatened constitute a
crime is merely incidental, but equity jurisdiction must exist
independently. The court believed the remedy at law to be
adequate and said that the mere fact that it cost time,
money, or effort to enforce the criminal law would not support a claim that adequate relief could not be granted at
law. The court further held that the possibility that many
11 316 M. App. 217. 45 N.E. (2d) 48 (1942).
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persons will be likely to violate the law and many suits will
enforce it was not enough to warrant
thus be required to 12
injunction.
relief by
The third case, that of Campbell v. Campbell,3 involved
a rather unusual application of the remedy of sequestration.
The will therein concerned bequeathed property to the testator's widow for life and upon her death to the testator's
brothers and sisters "then living," the remaindermen to
have an interest only in the proceeds from a sale of the
property after the death of the widow. The widow renounced
the will and filed a complaint to partition wherein she requested the appointment of a trustee to hold and manage
the proceeds of sale for the contingent remaindermen. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the remainders were
contingent and denied partition inasmuch as the remaindermen had no interest in the property but only in the proceeds.
The court therefore directed that a trustee be appointed to
hold one-half of the property or its proceeds and to manage
the same until the death of the widow. The case is also of
interest on the question of the acceleration of remainders
upon renunciation of the will by the surviving spouse. 4
Use of the writ of ne exeat in connection with divorce
proceedings depends solely upon statutory authority rather
than on general equitable principles.' 5 As a consequence,
full compliance with statutory requirements is essential according to Andersen v. Andersen,16 which quashed such a
writ when it appeared that the plaintiff, with judicial permission, had merely filed a personal bond of limited amount
without sureties. The discretion granted the chancellor in
7
the case of taking bond upon the issuance of an injunction
was found to be lacking in case of ne exeat writs, and the
statute relative thereto was treated as being mandatory in
its nature.
One legislative change in the law may be mentioned.
12 On this point, the court relied upon People v. Universal Chiropractors' Ass'n,
302 Ill. 228, 134 N.E. 4 (1922).
13 380 Ill. 22, 42 N.E. (2d) 547 (1942).
14 See a capable discussion on this and other points involved in the case in 37
Ill. L. Rev. 277.
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 97, § 1.
16 315 Ill. App. 380, 43 N.E. (2d) 176 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 69, § 9.
REVIw 123.
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The statute dealing with the issuance of injunctions has been
amended by deleting the language which purported to confer
power on a master in chancery to issue the same or to approve an injunction bond.' By so doing, the legislature took
cognizance of the decision in Bottom v. City of Edwardsville19 which had declared Section 2 of the statute unconstitutional as being an attempt to confer judicial power on a
ministerial officer.
PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS

Three decisions concerning venue or the manner of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant are of significance.
Reliance was placed, in Consolidated Gasoline Company v.
Lexow,20 on Section 7 of the Civil Practice Act 2 ' to justify
plaintiff's action in bringing suit in St. Clair County to reform
a written lease even though all the defendants resided in
Madison County. A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction" was held to admit the truth of plaintiff's allegation
that the lease transaction had occurred partly in St. Clair
and partly in Madison County, hence established the fact
that proper venue existed. The argument that it was physically and legally impossible for a lease, or any other contract, to be made partly in one county and partly in another,
since until full execution and delivery the document was
A common sense, rather than a
nugatory, was rejected.
legal, definition has thus been given to the words "some part
thereof" as found in the venue provision.
Jurisdiction over a non-resident motorist, in causes
growing out of his use of the highways of this state, may be
obtained in the manner provided by Section 20a of the Motor
Vehicles Act.2 3 Though it was held in an earlier case that
such provision applied to corporate users as well as individLaws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 193; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 69, §§ 3, 8, 9 and 10.
19 308 Ill. 68, 139 N.E. 5 (1923).
20 316 Ill. App. 257, 44 N.E. (2d) 927 (1942).
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 131, directs that every civil action shall be
commenced in the county ". . . in which the transaction or some part thereof
occurred out of which the cause of action arose."
22 The court found that the motion actually conferred jurisdiction over the
parties because signed by, the attorney for the defendants instead of being pleaded
in person. See Pratt v. Harris, 295 Ill. 504, 129 N.E. 277 (1920); McGuire v. Outdoor Life Pub. Co., 311 Ill. App. 267, 35 N.E. (2d) 817 (1941).
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 95%, § 23.
's
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uals,2 4 no interpretation had been given in this state to the
words "use and operation . . . over the highways" prior to
the decision in Brauer Machine and Supply Company v.
Parkhill Truck Company. 5 It was held therein that service
could only be had in the manner provided by statute if the
cause of action grew out of conduct, or omission thereof,
actually occurring on the highway, hence an attempt to secure jurisdiction in a case involving negligence in unloading
a motor vehicle at rest on private property was held improper. The mere fact that the state highway had been used
by the non-resident in bringing the loaded truck to the place
of unloading was held to be of no consequence.
Mistaken identity led the trial court into error, in Reisman v. Central Manufacturing DistrictBank,26 when a decree
fixing a stockholder's liability was predicated upon service
of summons upon one having the same name as, but not in
fact, the defendant stockholder. When the error was discovered some five years later, an attempt to bring in the real
defendant was contested on the ground that no authority
existed, at that late date, to permit the issuance of alias or
pluries summons or to vacate the earlier decree. It was held,
however, that the decision in Trupp v. First Englewood State
Bank27 was not applicable to the situation presented; that
jurisdiction might be restored by stipulation to vacate the
original decree; 2 1 and that, until process had been served
on the real defendant, alias and pluries summons might be
issued as required. The tactics of the real defendant were
criticised as an endeavor to create a fiction by which the
real owner of the stock would, on a pure technicality, be
relieved from a liability that he did not disavow.
Nothing of significance has been decided on the subject
of the content to be given to the complaint or answer. It
24 Jones v. Pebler, 371 IIl. 309, 20 N.E. (2d) 592, 125 A. L. R. 451 (1939).

See

also note in 17 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 69.
25 318 Ill. App. 56, 47 N.E. (2d) 521 (1943), affirmed 383 IM. 569, 50 N.E. (2d)
836 (1943).
26 316 Ill. App. 371, 45 N.E. (2d) 90 (1942).
27 307 ILl. App. 258, 30 N.E. (2d) 198 (1940), noted in 20 CHicAco--K'm
LAw
REVIEw 68.
28 It appeared that such a stipulation was entered into between the plaintiff's
attorney and the person originally served with summons consenting to the vacation of the original erroneous decree. See Humphreyville v. Culver, Page, Hoyne
& Co., 73 IMl. 485 (1874).
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should be remembered, however, that the function of a
counterclaim, like the former cross-bill in equity, 29 is essentially offensive in nature, hence it should be used only where
the defendant seeks affirmative relief of some sort. If defendant merely desires to defeat the plaintiff's cause of action, the defensive answer will suffice. A defendant seeking a
different construction of a will than that sought by the plaintiff should, according to Warren v. McRoberts,0 use a counterclaim, though it was there held to be harmless error to
strike a counterclaim when the court found that the construction desired by defendant was not legally proper.
Motion practice now seems to be fairly well understood,
judging from the absence of decisions commenting on the
use of the code substitute for the demurrer. Notice may be
made, however, of the decision in People, for Use of Pope
County, v. Shetler 31 wherein the defendant moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that there was another action
pending in the same court involving the same parties and
the same subject matter. His motion apparently failed to
refer to such other cause by case number, docket and page
number, or other identifying factors, and no affidavit was
annexed to the motion supplying such particulars. 2 It was,
therefore, held error to grant such motion, apparently on
the theory that without such information the trial court could
not be expected to take judicial notice of its own records.
At about the same time, the Illinois Supreme Court, in
Blyman v. Shelby Loan & Trust Company,33 specifically took
judicial notice of the pendency of another cause before it as
reason for refusing to consolidate the appeals in two other
cases. Since one or the other of these decisions is necessarily
erroneous, the better view would seem to be that followed by
the Supreme Court."
Where error does occur in the drafting of pleadings, the
practitioner is usually able to avoid the effect thereof by
29 Daly v. Daly, 299 Ill. 268, 132 N.E. 495 (1921).
30 315 Ill. App. 499, 43 N.E. (2d) 401 (1942).
31 318 Ill. App. 279, 47 N.E. (2d) 732 (1943).
32 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110 § 172(1), for the use of affidavits to supply
information not of record.
33 382 Ill. 415, 47 N.E. (2d) 706 (1943).
34 Bailey v. Kerr, 180 Ill. 412, 54 N.E. 165 (1899). See also Wigmore, Evidence
(2d Ed.), Vol. V, § 2579, p. 593.
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amendment. He should, however, recognize the limitations
placed on the right to amend by two recent decisions. While
Section 46(2) of the Civil Practice Act 5 was enacted for the
purpose of permitting plaintiff to amend a complaint so as
to more correctly state the cause of action intended to be
asserted without being faced with the defense of the statute
of limitations, such right to amend was qualified by the decision in Mann v. City of Chicago30 and held to be inapplicable
where the amendment, filed after the statute had run, sought
to add an additional party plaintiff. No quarrel with the decision would exist if the additional party so sought to be added
was attempting to assert an independent, though related,
claim to that set forth in the original complaint. Its application to the facts therein set forth, however, seems erroneous
since the additional party was a joint owner of the demand
originally asserted, hence should have been accorded the
benefit of Section 26 of the Act. 7 Section 46(2) also purports
to authorize wide latitude in permitting amendment both
before and after trial, and even after judgment, in order
that controversies might be speedily and finally determined
on the merits. A most decided limitation was placed thereon,
however, by the decision in Bollaert v. Kankakee Tile &
Brick Company 8 which holds that amendment after judgment in the trial court is possible only if accomplished before
jurisdiction of the cause is lost by the filing of notice of appeal, even though the purpose of the amendment is to make
the pleadings conform to the proof. Earlier decisions treating other parts of the same section as unconstitutional 9
would tend to indicate that inherent weakness is present in
that part thereof which permits amendment in the reviewing
court after appeal has been taken. Amendment, then, to be
effective should occur before judgment."°
36 315 111. App. 179, 42 N.E.
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 170(2).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW RLriEw 100.
37 11. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 150, permits the adding of new parties, or

(2d) 862 (1942), noted in 21

dropping of misjoined parties, at any stage of the case "as the ends of justice
may require."
38 317 Ill. App. 120, 45 N.E. (2d) 506 (1942.), noted in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAw
39 See 21 CHICAG0-KENT LAW REviEw 247, particularly note 20.
REVIW 244.
40 If presented in apt time, the rule would still seem to be that the granting of
the right to amend is discretionary, and upon review such discretion will not be
disturbed except in cases of clear abuse: McGlaughlin v. Pickerel, 381 IMI. 574,
46 N.E. (2d) 368 (1943).
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THE TRIAL OF THE CASE

Comment appears elsewhere on the action of the Supreme Court declaring unconstitutional the recent amend41
ment regarding waiver of trial by jury in criminal cases.
If such statute was improper because, by it, the legislature
invaded the province of the courts, it would be expected that
the same result would have been achieved when the court
was' asked to pass on the validity of Section 64(1) of the
Civil Practice Act' purporting to regulate trial by jury in
civil cases. It was, nevertheless, held differently, in Stephens
v. Kasten, 4 3 where the court sustained the statute but decided that the action of the trial judge in rejecting defendant's belated 4 demand for trial by jury was an abuse of
discretion. Of somewhat similar nature was the decision in
Gariepy v. Springer45 wherein defendant's demand was not
made until plaintiff was given leave to amend his equity
proceeding by adding a count in law. The trial court had
there deemed the request came too late on the theory that
since defendant knew, at the time of filing appearance, that
plaintiff might ask for and obtain leave to file additional
counts he should have then made the demand even though
the status of the litigation would not then have warranted it.
It was held that the court should have granted defendant
time to file a jury demand when permitting plaintiff to amend
his complaint.
A proceeding to contest an election, being neither a suit
at law nor a proceeding in chancery, is sui generis, though
at one time it was provided that the case should be treated
as one in chancery.4 6 The present statute, adopted in 1935,
provides that evidence may be taken therein "in the same
' '47 It
manner and upon like notice as in other civil cases.
was, therefore, held in Flake v. Pretze4 8 that the hearing
See post, p. 39.
42 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 188(1).
383 Ill.127, 48 N.E. (2d) 508 (1943).
44 It appeared that the defense was originally undertaken by the attorneys for
defendant's insurer who neglected to demand a jury trial at time of filing appearance. Later, defendant through counsel of his own choosing sought to amend his
defensive pleadings and then moved for an extension of time in which to fie a
jury demand.
45 318 Ill.
App. 523, 48 N.E. (2d) 572 (1943).
46 Cahill Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 46, 1 128.
47 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 46, § 23-22.
48 381 IMI. 498, 46 N.E. (2d) 375 (1943).
41

43
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must be conducted by the court, and reference of the cause
to a master in chancery or special commissioner to take
testimony and render a report would be a violation of the
litigant's rights. Though a special commission may issue to
count the ballots,4 9 it was deemed essential that the judge
preside over the hearing in order to give such election contests the preferential and expeditious treatment that is re50
quired by law.
The plaintiff's ability to force the trial court to order a
nonsuit by deliberately absenting himself from trial was involved in Flassig v. Newman 5 1 where it was held that his
52
failure to comply with Section 52 of the Civil Practice Act
justified the court in entering a judgment on the merits in
favor of the defendant. Though the statute merely purports
to regulate the plaintiff's conduct when applying for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, the court seemed to feel
the same rule should be applied when plaintiff deliberately
stays away so as not to be compelled to seek such relief.
Similar force was given, in Marks v. Thos. Cook & Sons3 to an order of a Federal district
Wagon-Lits, Incorporated,;
court entered pursuant to Rule 12(e) of that court54 dismissing a suit for plaintiff's disregard of an order directing the
filing of a bill of particulars. Holding that under the rules
thereof the order of dismissal was an adjudication on the
merits of the case,5 5 the local court concluded that no further litigation could be maintained on the same cause of
action even though, in fact, no trial of the merits had been
granted. The litigant who chooses the forum for the trial of
his case must, then, be expected to prosecute the same effectively therein or stand to lose his claim.
An evidence question of some interest arose in the case
of People v. Wells5 6 wherein the defendant was charged with
the forgery of a check. The prosecution introduced in eviTalbott v. Thompson, 350 IM. 86, 182 N.E. 784 (1932).
50 M11.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 46, § 23-23.
51 317 Ill. App. 635, 47 N.E. (2d) 527 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAw
REVrw 348.
52 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 176.
53 316 Ill. App. 318, 45 N.E. (2d) 66 (1942).
54 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723c.
55 Rule 41(b), Rules of Civil Procedure of the United States District Courts;
28 U. S. C. A. following 9 723c.
56 380 IlM. 347, 44 N.E. (2d) 32 (1942).
49
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dence, over defendant's objection, certain photographs made
on a recordak machine of other checks purported to have
been forged by the defendant at or about the time of the
forgery charged in the indictment. Such proof was offered
to show the criminal intention in making and issuing the
check in question. Although recordak machines have been
in constant use for a considerable period of time, particularly in banking circles, it was held that their products were
inadmissible as being secondary rather than primary evidence. Had it been shown that the original checks were unobtainable, the photographic copies would, of course, have
been admissible provided sufficient foundation was laid. The
court was, no doubt, right in applying old rules to new processes, but the practical and accurate records made by such
machines have made it possible for modern business to bring
its "shop books" up to date. It would seem time, then, for
the legislature to amend the evidence rules to conform to
current practices. Such, at least, is the case in the federal
courts where evidence of this character is treated as being
primary rather than secondary.5 7 A step has been made in
that direction, for a recent statute enacted in Illinois permits public officials to keep their public records in such
fashion.5 8
Constitutional guarantees against illegal search and
0
seizure 59 were the deciding factor in People v. Martin"
where it was held to be error to permit witnesses to testify,
over objection, as to information learned by the prosecution
as the result of such a search and seizure. It could well be
argued that a distinction could be drawn between the illegally seized records and the direct testimony of witnesses
whose existence and potential evidence was discovered as a
result thereof. The court, however, made no such distinction
but said that as the information was not learned from independent sources it could not be used as a basis for conviction.
But one change was made in the Evidence Act by the
legislature. The period of notice required for the taking of
57

28 U. S. C. A. § 695.

58 Laws 1943, p.-, S.B. No. 250; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 116, § 31 et seq.

59 nl. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 6.
60 382 Ill. 192, 46 N.E. (2d) 997 (1943), noted in 21 CmcAo-KENT LAW REvyw 345.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

depositions depends somewhat upon the distance between
the place of holding court and the place of taking the deposition. One additional day's notice was heretofore required for
each fifty miles, 61 but the speed of modern travel is recognized in an amendment making the extra allowance necessary only for every four hundred miles.62
According to common law principles, only one judgment
could be pronounced in a law action even though the plaintiff's declaration may have presented several claims.6"
Modification of this concept was provided by Section 50(1)
of the Civil Practice Act6 4 which permits more than one
judgment where required by the necessities of the case. A
too literal reading of this section, however, appears to have
lead the court, in Shaw v. Courtney,6 5 into the error of sanctioning the apportionment of damages and the imposition of
separate judgments against several defendants joined as
joint tort-feasors. It would seem as though the legislative
purpose was to permit the use of separate judgments only
when the plaintiff presented truly separate, though related,
demands against the several defendants.
Where a decretal order is to be drafted after the trial
judge has orally indicated his decision, it is customary for
the attorney preparing the same to submit a copy thereof to
his opponent with notice of motion giving the time at which
the original will be presented for signature. It was held, in
Mecartney v. Hale,66 that such notice need not comply with
rule of court as to time and manner of service, particularly
where the order conforms to the judge's announcement as to
the disposition of the cause. The notice referred to in the
rule was deemed to be necessary only when a hearing of
some kind was sought.
By abolishing terms of court and substituting a thirtyday period from date of judgment before finality attaches
thereto,6' the legislature probably intended to alleviate the
61 IRl. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 51, § 24.
62 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 441; 111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 51, §§ 24 and 28.
63 Brewer v. Christian, 9 Ill. App. 57 (1881).
64 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 174(1).
65 317 Il. App. 422, 46 N.E. (2d) 170 (1943), noted in 21 CHIcAGO-KENT LAw
REVmIw 249.
66 318 IRl. App. 502, 48 N.E. (2d) 570 (1943).
67 IIl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 77, § 82.
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harshness of the rule found in Cramer v. Illinois Commercial
Men's Association 8 and similar cases. By abolishing the
writ of error coram nobis and substituting a motion in lieu
thereof,69 the legislature probably intended to simplify the
method by which the trial court might correct its own errors
of fact in rendering judgment. The confusion generated by
such amendments, however, has not yet been allayed.
Though held inapplicable to secure review of decrees in
chancery, 70 a motion of the type prescribed was given the
effect of a complaint in chancery in Nikola v. Campus
7 A simple petition
Towers Apartment Building Corporation.
to vacate a judgment, such as would be used during the
thirty-day period, was likewise held sufficient, in Jerome v.
72 to secure re5019-21 Quincy Street Building Corporation,
lief after the thirty-day period had expired from a default
judgment erroneously entered because the sheriff failed to
return the summons in apt time. A dissent thereto was noted
on the ground that the error was one appearing on the face
of the record and, presumably, known to the trial court so
not one which could be raised by such a motion but which
could be corrected only by appeal.7 8
DAMAGES

The much litigated case of Ritter v. Ritter74 has reached
an end. 75 It had involved the question of the right of a successful plaintiff to maintain a subsequent action to recover,
as damages, the fees paid to his attorney for the conduct of
the prior suit. The Supreme Court, following an exhaustive
review of the cases bearing on the subject, has now concluded that it is better that the defendant should be permitted to present any defense he may have or should deem
68 260 IMl. 516, 103 N.E. 459 (1913).
69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 196.
70 Frank v. Salomon, 376 Ill. 439, 34 N.E. (2d) 424 (1941), noted in 19 CHICAGOKENT LAW REvi.w 372.
71 303 Ill. App. 516, 25 N.E. (2d) 582 (1940), noted in 19 CHiCAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEW 61.

72 317 Ill. App. 335, 45 N.E. (2d) 878 (1943).
73 Chapman v. North American Life Ins. Co., 292 IMl. 179, 126 N.E. 732 (1920).
74 308 Ill. App. 337, 32 N.E.

(2d) 185

(1941),

noted in

20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW

REVIEW 83, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 760, 30 Ill. B. J. 69; 313 Ill. App. 407, 40 N.E. (2d)
565 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RuvmW 30.

75 381 IIl. 549, 46 N.E. (2d) 41 (1943), reversing 313 Ill. App. 407, 40 N.E. (2d)
565 (1942), noted in 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1199.
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expedient rather than to be compelled to abandon the same
to avoid the risk of subjecting himself to a second suit based
upon his alleged wrongful conduct in interposing such defense. The defendant's willful, malicious, fraudulent, or intentional conduct in so doing will not, therefore, expose
him to further liability. Since the adoption of the Civil Practice Act, however, such conduct will not go unpunished for,
by the provisions of Section 41 thereof, 7 the interposition of
defenses "made without reasonable cause" may subject the
party to the payment of such "reasonable expenses$' as may
be incurred by the other party in disproving the same. It has
been suggested that "reasonable expenses" should include
attorney's fees as well as other costs, 7 7 and should be taxed
in the initial litigation rather than in a separate suit.
Though breach of contract may induce a loss of anticipated profits, recovery thereof is denied if the claim be regarded as too remote, contingent, or speculative, since such
7
is regarded as not in the contemplation of the partiess.
An
unusual application was given to this rule in Hippard Coal
79 wherein a
Company v. Illinois Power & Light Corporation
power consumer claimed damages from a public utility on
the ground the latter had failed to deliver electrical energy
of sufficient voltage to operate the mining machinery adequately thereby causing a loss in production with a consequent loss of profits. Relying on analogies furnished by cases
in which the defendant delayed delivery of machinery or
failed to repair existing equipment promptly, the court came
to the conclusion that the increase in cost of production and
the decrease in volume of output, though supported by testimony, represented claims too speculative in nature hence
were not recoverable. Impetus may have been given to the
decision by the fact that the court could find no clear undertaking on the part of the utility to provide power of the specified voltage, but, with cost accounting what it is, it would
seem as if the items presented were founded on fact and not
merely on guesswork, hence should have been allowed as
76

I1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 165.

77 See Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated (Chicago, 1933), 88, and cases there

cited.
78 Frazer v. Smith, 60 Ill. 145 (1871).
79 317 IMI. App. 47, 45 N.E. (2d) 701 (1942).
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elements of damage, assuming that liability itself was
established.
Under Section 40(4) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act 80 a
defendant may, if he so wishes, narrow the issues in litigation to the single question of the amount of damages by a
pleading stating his desire to contest only thereon. According to the holding in Edwards v. Ely,81 the same result
may be achieved by defendant's action at the trial in admitting liability or fault and questioning the extent of the damages. If he does so, then it is regarded as error to submit to
the jury a form of verdict permitting a finding of not guilty.
On the theory that for every invasion of a right the law
grants at least nominal damages,82 such an admission by
defendant would require a verdict of guilty, carrying with it
the costs of suit, even though the plaintiff should be unable
to convince the court or jury that substantial damages had
the court indicated, would
been incurred. Any other result,
3
be "obviously inequitable."1
APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court is permissible in cases in which the validity of a municipal ordinance
is involved and in which the trial judge certifies that in his
opinion the public interest so requires.8 4 Upon superficial
reading of the pertinent statute, it would seem that not only
must validity of an ordinance be involved but that, in addition, a judicial certificate that "public interest" is concerned
is required to support direct appeal. It was held, in City of
Bloomington v. Wirrick,85 however, that such requirement
is divisible, no certificate being necessary where constitutional questions have been properly raised, but required
where the ordinance is attacked on other grounds. Objection to a belated attempt to file such a certificate 8 was,
80 11. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 164(4).
81 317 I1. App. 599, 47 N.E. (2d) 344 (1943).
82 McClure v. Hoopeston Gas & Electric Co., 303 IM. 89, 135 N.E. 43, 25 A. L. R.
250 (1922).
88 317 IlM.App. 599 at 606, 47 N.E. (2d) 344 at 347.
84 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 199(1).
85 381 Ill. 347, 45 N.E. (2d) 852 (1943).
86 Where required, it must be filed in the Supreme Court within the time for
filing the record: First Nat. Bank of Woodlawn v. Watkins, 370 Ill. 445, 19 N.E.
(2d) 336 (1939).
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therefore, rejected since the case was one in which no certificate was required. Earlier cases 87 were distinguished on
the ground that the questions there involved concerned interpretation rather than validity of ordinances.
Though the right to combine several claims in one proceeding is conferred by statute,"' the fact of such a combination has in no way enlarged the jurisdiction of the reviewing courts, according to Borman v. Oetzell, 9 so the practitioner must be careful to prosecute separate appeals if, by
chance, a different method of review applies to each of the
separate demands so joined. The court also indicated therein
that, since the original record could not be in two places at
one time, a separate record or a certified copy thereof should
be obtained for use in each of the appropriate reviewing
courts. As the separate claims might lead to separate judgments in the trial court,9" the practitioner should also be
careful to see that the time of appeal does not run on one
of the claims, even though the trial court may have reserved
jurisdiction over the others.
The conclusiveness of the order of the Appellate Court
on an appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction is vouchsafed by Section 78 of the Civil Practice Act 9
which expressly states that: "No appeal shall be taken from
the order entered by said Appellate Court on any such appeal." An attempt to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court by granting leave to appeal was, therefore, held improvident in Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Janitors' Union, Local

No.

1.92

Care should be observed in drafting the notice of appeal
required by Section 74 of the Civil Practice Act 9" in order
that the reviewing court may see it has jurisdiction to entertain the cause. It should, generally, show that the order appealed from is a final order, but in Luner v. Gelles94 it was
87 City of Litchfield v. Hart, 372 Ill. 457, 24 N.E. (2d) 345 (1939); Village of Lake
Zurich v. Deschauer, 310 Ill. 209, 141 N.E. 761 (1923).
88 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 168.
89 382 Ill. 110, 46 N.E. (2d) 914 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 332.
90 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 174(1).
91 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 202.
92 382 Ill. 124, 46 N.E. (2d) 27 (1943).
93 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 198.
94 314 Ill. App. 659, 42 N.E. (2d) 313 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVEw 97.
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held that a notice of appeal stating that review was sought
of an order denying a motion for a new trial was sufficient,
despite the fact that such an order is not subject to review,
because the court considered that appellant's obvious intention was to appeal from the final judgment rendered subsequent to the denial of such motion. Liberal construction was
deemed necessary to avoid dismissing an appeal for error
of such trivial nature. Of similar effect is Doner v. Phoenix
Joint Stock Land Bank of Kansas City95 where it was held
that the appeal was taken from the order dismissing the suit
rather than from the earlier order striking the plaintiff's
complaint. Though plaintiff neither asked for leave to amend
nor signified an election to stand by his complaint, he was
treated as though he had chosen the latter alternative
thereby creating a specific issue before the reviewing court.
A lawyer who had been found disqualified, by reason of
interest, from representing the parties to a pending case
was denied the right to appeal from the order restraining
him from service as such attorney, in Almon v. American
9 6 The decision was predicated on
Carloading Corporation.
the grounds that such order was not a final order within the
meaning of Section 77, nor an interlocutory one within Section 78 of the Civil Practice Act, 7 and also because he was
deemed to lack such an interest in the merits of the proceeding as would be required to support .an appeal.
The finality of the order appealed from was also involved
in Walters v. Mercantile National Bank of Chicago,"
wherein it was held that no appeal would lie from a decree
which construed one paragraph of a will but reserved jurisdiction of the cause for the purpose of construing other paragraphs thereof upon which the parties were at issue. Despite
the fact that Section 50 of the Civil Practice Act99 purports
to authorize the trial court to enter several separate judgments or decrees where necessary, the court held such liberality did not extend to the point of sanctioning piecemeal
95 381 Ill.
106, 45 N.E. (2d) 20 (1942).
96 380 II. 524, 44 N.E. (2d) 592 (1942), reversing 312 Il1. App. 225, 38 N.E. (2d)
362 (1941), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 186.
97 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §§ 201-2.
98 380 IMI.477, 44 N.E. (2d) 429 (1942).
99 li. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 174.
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disposition of a cause since litigation might thereby be prolonged indefinitely. Inasmuch as the issues concerning other
portions of the will had already been settled, the court's position might be regarded as a reasonable one. It should be
noted, however, that under the prior practice successive decrees in will construction cases were not unusual.' The decision might, therefore, be regarded as an unfortunate one
if it was intended to prevent any appeal until all questions
of construction had arisen and had been determined, or was
treated as making the first decree res adjudicata on all questions regardless whether known or unknown at the time
thereof.
The period in which an appeal may be taken begins to
run "from the entry of the order, decree, judgment or other
determination complained of," according to Section 76(1) of
the Civil Practice Act.2 Just what constituted "entry" of
the order was the point involved in Snook v. Shaw3 where
the court determined that, insofar as equity decrees are concerned, entry does not occur until the decree is drawn up in
written form, is approved and signed by the court and enrolled, hence an appeal within the allotted period from that
date was taken in apt time. In thus carrying forward what
was the recognized equity practice prior to the adoption of
the Civil Practice Act,4 the court is indirectly hinting that
the term "entry" as applied to law judgments will probably
be given its earlier connotation, to-wit: effective as soon as
5
orally uttered by the judge.
A question arose, in Lukas v. Lukas,, as to whether or
not the trial court had jurisdiction, after expiration of the
time allowed by rule of court,7 to grant an extension of time
for the purpose of preparing and filing the transcript of pro' Compare Brown v. Kamerer, 276 Ill. 69, 114 N.E. 544 (1916), with Kamerer v.
Kamerer, 281 IMI.587, 117 N.E. 1027 (1917).
2 III. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 200(1).
3 315 Il.
App. 594, 43 N.E. (2d) 417 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RVEmw 98.
4 Hughes v. Washington, 65 Ill. 245 (1872); Horn v. Horn, 234 Ill. 268, 84 N.E. 904
(1908).
5 Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Ashelford, 268 Ill. 87, 108 N.E. 761 (1915).
6 381 Ill. 429, 45 N.E. (2d) 869 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KsENT LAW REVIEw
247. Wilson, J., dissented without opinion.
7 I.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 259.36, fixes a fifty-day period after notice of
appeal in which to file the report of proceedings.
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ceedings. Holding that a nunc pro tunc order granting such
extension, entered one week after the fifty-day period had
expired, was invalid, the Supreme Court laid emphasis on
the fact that orders granting extensions must, by reason of
language contained in the rule, be entered before the allotted
period has expired. It further held that the mere presentation of such report to the judge was not enough but that the
same must be filed in the trial court if it is to become a
part of the record.
Attention was called last year to the seemingly harsh
decision by the Appellate Court in Swain v. Hoberg8 concerning the manner of presenting the essential data which should
be contained in an appellate brief. The Supreme Court, reversing such decision,9 has now indicated that while formal
compliance with the rule of court on that point 1" is not difficult and should be observed, the penalty of dismissing the
appeal for an infraction thereof is too severe. Presumably,
the litigant hereafter will be subjected to an order striking
his brief from the file unless the same wholly fails to inform
the reviewing court as to the issues before it, in which case
affirmance pro forma might be proper.
A motion to dismiss the appeal in People v. Barrett"
because appellant had filed no brief therein was denied when
it appeared that such case reached the reviewing court upon
petition for leave to appeal. Since the content of such petition
is similar to that of a brief,"2 it was held that no additional
brief was necessary though the court thought that appellant
might have convenienced it more by the filing of a formal
brief.
Statements have appeared in a number of earlier cases"
to the effect that it is not proper appellate practice merely
to refer in the brief to the questioned instructions by number, but that they should be set out in full therein. The
14
Appellate Court for the First District, in Crisler v. Zahart,
8 312 Il. App. 610, 38 N.E. (2d) 966 (1942), noted in 20 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REVIEW 264.
9 Swain v. Hoberg, 380 Ill. 442, 44 N.E. (2d) 38 (1942).
10 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 259.39.
11 383 Il. 207, 48 N.E. (2d) 928 (1943).
12 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 259.29 with § 259.39.
18 See Zorger v. Hillman's, 287 Ill. App. 357, 4 N.E. (2d) 900 (1936), and cases
there cited.
14 318 11. App. 220, 47 N.E. (2d) 542 (1943).
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has now unanimously"0 repudiated such statements and approves the view that reference to such instructions in the
abstract of record is sufficient, so long as the error complained of be sufficiently pointed out in the brief.
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

A number of interesting problems came before the courts
of Illinois during the past year dealing with the scope of the
judgment order and the methods by which same may be
made enforcible. For example, it is hoped that some light
through the tangle created by the four-to-two decision in
Blakeslee's Storage Warehouses v. City of Chicago,' regarding interest on a judgment, may have been provided by
the decision in People ex rel. 1111 North La Salle Corporation
v. City of Chicago.17 It was there held that the claim for
interest was an integral part of the judgment and was not
barred from collection prior to the time when enforcement
of the judgment itself was barred. 8 The exceptional rule of
the Blakeslee case was minimized by holding that the shorter
statute of limitations would apply only where the principal
amount of the judgment had been paid prior to the time
when suit was instituted to collect the statutory interest
thereon. 19
While the use of the action of garnishment has been
limited, by Ancateau v. Commercial Casualty Insurance
20
Company°
to cases wherein the judgment is final,2 ' it has
been expanded in another direction. In 1935, the legislature
amended the statute to provide that attachment and garnishment proceedings might cover "a money claim, whether
15 The opinion appears to have been submitted to the judges of the other divisions of that court, who noted special concurrence therein. See 318 Ill.App. 220
at 223, 47 N.E. (2d) 542 at 544.
16 369 Ill. 480, 17 N.E. (2d) 1 (1938), noted in 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 189
and 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 60.
17 316 Ill. App. 66, 43 N.E. (2d) 691 (1942). noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REmnw 197.
1s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 77, § 7, directs that every execution issued upon a
judgment shall direct the collection of interest thereon.
19 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 77, § 7, was recently amended to change the rate of
interest from six per centum to five per centum: Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 186.
20 318 Ill.
App. 553, 48 N.E. (2d) 440 (1943), noted post, p. 82.
21 The fact that an appeal was pending on the original judgment, even though
the same did not operate as a supersedeas, was held sufficient to make the garnishment action therein premature despite the fact that the judgment creditor
could have used execution to reach the judgment debtor's assets.
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liquidated or unliquidated, and whether sounding in contract or tort. 2 2 Such extension induced the court, in Dunham
v. Kauffman,3 to hold that attachment and garnishment
were now available as adjuncts to an equitable proceeding
provided the same involved a "money claim." In so holding,
the court negatived earlier cases which had held that an
equitable attachment proceeding could not be maintained
since, until judgment had been rendered and execution had
been returned unsatisfied, the creditor had failed to demonstrate the inadequacy of his legal remedy.24
In Barrett v. Daly 2' the court decided that the 1941
amendment to Section 73 of the Civil Practice Act, 26 providing for the use of citation proceedings in all courts of
27
record, did.not supersede Section 49 of the Chancery Act,
but rather created an additional remedy for the enforcement
of judgments. As a consequence, the judgment creditor is
now provided with a choice of remedies against a debtor
who has undertaken to conceal his assets, since he may
pursue the newer citation method or use the older creditor's
bill.
Challenge was directed, in Bank of Edwardsville v.
Raffaelle,2 8 to the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Civil
Practice Act 29 which authorizes constructive service of process on a non-resident defendant in an action to revive a
judgment or decree. It was claimed that such a proceeding
was as much a personal action as the original case in which
the judgment had been pronounced, hence constructive service of process on a person resident at the time of the original suit and personally served therein but who had since
left the state was null and void. Deciding that a scire facias
proceeding does not determine the obligations of defendant
to plaintiff but rather raises issues as to whether an original
22 Laws 1935, p. 210; IMl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 11, § 1.
23 319 Ill. App. 229, 48 N.E. (2d) 777 (1943), noted post, p. 80. Matchett, P.

J.,

wrote a dissenting opinion.
24 See, for example, Miller v. Davidson, 8 Il. (3 Gil.) 518 (1846); Phelps v.
Foster, 18 Ill. 309 (1857).
25 319 Ill. App. 169, 48 N.E. (2d) 717 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Raviaw 334.
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 197.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 22, § 49.
28 381 Ill. 486, 45 N.E. (2d) 651 (1943).
29 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 138.
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judgment was rendered or, if rendered, has since been satisfied, and is, therefore, really a continuation of the prior
action, the court concluded the section in question was not
violative of either the state or the federal constitutions. °
Dictum in Bickerdike v. Allen 31 to the effect that a scire
facias proceeding was an action in personam was
repudiated.
The case of Ingalls v. Raklios3 2 was again before the
reviewing court. This time the judgment creditor was appealing from an order which refused to find that the word
"malice" as used in the finding was equivalent to a finding
that "malice was the gist of the action." The Supreme Court
had previously held that the judgment would not support a
capias 33 It was now held that, inasmuch as three years had
elapsed since the original judgment was entered and no
written memorandum existed to justify alteration, the original judgment order would have to stand.
Relief from a commitment order for contempt of court
in refusing to account for trust funds was granted by the
trial judge over a year after the contemnor had been imprisoned. An effort to compel the judge to vacate such release order failed in People ex rel. Meier v. Lewe, 4 wherein
the petitioning creditor claimed that, since the order of release was a modification of the original order finding a contempt of court, the trial judge had lost jurisdiction of the
cause. It was, however, held that the release order was a
new proceeding based on a separate hearing and not merely
a modification of the original decision, hence well within the
jurisdiction of the court. If this were not so, the court said,
there would be "no court and no method by which one incarcerated for contempt of court . . . could ever hope to
obtain his freedom. . . . Such a situation would amount to
life imprisonment for debt, which is contrary to the genius
of our form of government. ' ' 33 The court also took occasion
80 In general, see Collin County Nat. Bank v. Hughes, 155 F. 389 (1907).
31 157 Ill.
95, 41 N.E. 740, 29 L. R. A. 782 (1895).
82 318 Ill.
App. 129, 47 N.E. (2d) 365 (1943).
33 Ingalls v. Raklios, 373 Ill. 404, 26 N.E. (2d) 468 (1940), reversing 301 Ill.App.
1, 21 N.E. (2d) 856 (1939), noted in 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 61, 19 CHICAGOKENr LAW REVIEw 75.
84 380 Il. 531, 44 N.E. (2d) 551 (1942).
385380 IMl. 531 at 538, 44 N.E. (2d) 551 at 555.
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to point out that if any error occurred in granting release
the same should be corrected by appeal. Mandamus against
the trial judge to expunge his order was not, therefore, a
proper method of review.
But one change in the statute law need be noticed. The
wage-exemption granted by the Garnishment Act 6 has been
amended so as to provide a clear exemption of twenty dollars per week exclusive of all pay-roll deductions in the form
7
of taxes.3
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

The statute relating to the commitment and detention of
criminal sexual psychopathic persons' was held to be a constitutional exercise of the police power in People v. Sims2
despite the defendant's contention that the same was invalid (1) because discriminatory in dividing sexual psychopaths into two groups, i.e. those charged with criminal acts
and those not so charged; (2) because it permitted the disclosure of other crimes, hence violated defendant's right to
an impartial trial; and (3) because the use of the psychiatric
report upon the defendant's condition violated his right to the
confrontation and cross-examination of the witnesses against
him. The first argument was disposed of on the ground that
the basis of classification was a reasonable one. The second,
on the ground that the proceeding for commitment was not a
criminal trial in the ordinary sense but rather was akin to
an inquiry into sanity before trial on an indictment. The
third point was rejected in the particular case since defendant had not preserved a transcript of the evidence, hence
the court had no way of knowing if error had been committed
in that regard. The statute does provide for personal examination of the accused by two qualified psychiatrists and also
requires them to file a report in writing of the result of their
examination together with their conclusions and recommendations. While the finding must be made by a jury, such report would undoubtedly carry considerable weight with
36 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 62, § 14.
37 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 457; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 62, § 14.
1 I. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, §§ 820-5.
2 382 Il1. 472, 47 N.E. (2d) 703 (1943).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 593. See also People v. Preston, 345 Ill. 11, 177
N. E. 761 (1931).
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them, hence the statute would seem to violate constitutional
guarantees of due process unless 4 the right of crossexamination was, in fact, permitted.
No other current decisions appear relating to the nature
of crime, its definition, or manner of commission. The legislature has, however, enacted several statutes affecting the
scope and content of criminal law. Thus the former statute
relating to the prevention of diseases of livestock5 has been
repealed and has been replaced by a new statute containing
penalties.' The discrimination against female employees, by
paying an unequal wage for equal work, has been made
criminal. 7 A second or subsequent conviction for driving a
motor vehicle without the owner's consent now carries additional penalties." One who knowingly aids the escape or attempted escape of a person committed to any state correctional institution is declared guilty of a misdemeanor.' The
fraudulent sale of adulterated, reclaimed, or falsely-labelled
lubricating oils is penalized," and the list of public nuisances
has been expanded by the addition of certain types of offensive conduct growing out of the drilling or operation of oil
wells."
As is usually the case, the work of the courts dealt principally with procedural matters. Thus, upon the return of an
indictment by the grand jury, the statute directs that the
judge shall order the clerk of the court "to copy such indictment ... upon the records of such court" so that, in case of
loss or destruction, the copy may serve as prima facie proof
of the contents thereof.12 While the statute does not prescribe
the precise record book to be used, it is usually the practice
of the clerk to enter the same in a record of criminal proceedings. For this reason, the defendant in People v. Grizzle
4 In civil lunacy proceedings heard before a jury, the statute expressly declares
that the rights of the person involved "shall be the same as those of any defendant in a civil suit." See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 912, § 5.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 8, § 62-86.
S.B. No. 360; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 8, H§ 168-191.
6 Laws 1943, p.-,
7 Laws 1943, p.-, S.B. No. 368; I1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 4a.
8 Laws 1943, p.-, S.B. No. 93; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 95%, § 39a.
H.B. No. 23; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 228a.
9 Laws 1943, p.-,
1o Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 606; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 335a.
11 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 812; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 466.
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943; Ch. 38, § 721.
13 381 Ill. 278, 44 N.E. (2d) 917 (1942), conviction reversed on other grounds.
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claimed his conviction was erroneous inasmuch as the clerk
had, inadvertently or otherwise, entered the record of the
return of the indictment among the chancery records of the
court. His highly technical objection was met by the statement that the record book, however it may be designated,
was one of the records of the court hence the entry therein
was sufficient to support the subsequent proceedings. Likewise unavailing was the contention, made in People v.
Hannon, 4 that the defendant's right to trial within four
months after demand made 15 had been violated because he
had been placed on trial one day after the four-month period
had expired. Upon ascertaining that the last day of the period
fell upon Sunday, the court invoked the provisions of the
statute providing that in computing time the first day shall
be excluded and the last day included "unless the last day
is Sunday . . . and then it shall also be excluded,"'" and
found no error.
The right to waive trial by jury in criminal cases has
experienced an unusual history in this state. Originally denied on the ground that the constitutional method required
trial by jury,' this view yielded, in 1930, to the concept that
trial by jury was not an integral part of the structure of
government but was, rather, a privilege of the defendant. 8
The exercise or waiver of such privilege, however, was
deemed a matter of some concern to the prosecution hence,
in 1932, it was held that trial by the court without a jury
could occur only if the state joined in such waiver. 19 The
absence of logic in such a view probably influenced the legislature, in 1941, to enact a brief statute vesting the privilege
exclusively in the hands of the defendant."0 By its decision
in People v. Scott,21 the Supreme Court has now declared
such statute unconstitutional as an attempted invasion of the
powers of the judiciary by a co-ordinate branch of the state
government. By so doing it has, whether wisely or not, re381 Ill. 206, 44 N.E. (2d) 923 (1942), conviction reversed
Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 748.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 131, § 1.
Ill.
585, 21 N.E. 563 (1889).
Harris v. People, 128 Ill.
250, 172 N.E.
18 People ex. rel. Swanson v. Fisher, 340 Ill.
19 People v. Scornavache, 347 Ill.403, 179 N.E. 909, 79 A.
20 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 574; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, §
21 383 Ill.
122, 48 N.E. (2d) 530 (1943),
14
15
16
17

on other grounds.

722 (1930).
L. R. 553 (1932).
736,

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

stored the view of the earlier cases, hence waiver of trial by
jury in criminal cases will require joint action by prosecution and defendant.
Punishment for the second offense is generally made
more severe, but questions still arise as to just what constitutes a "second" offense within the meaning of the applic22
able statute. It became necessary, in People v. Lund, for
23
the court to interpret Section 393 of the Criminal Code
which provides for increased punishment in case of a second
conviction for petty larceny by a person over the age of
eighteen years. Particularly involved was the question as to
whether the person had to be eighteen at the time of the
second conviction, regardless of the age at the time of the
prior offense, or whether the qualifying language applied to
both the first and the second offense. In holding an indictment
defective because it failed to allege that defendant was over
eighteen at the time of the prior conviction, the court considered that the legislative purpose was to punish the confirmed recidivist more severely rather than to penalize a
person by taking into consideration his petty transgressions
and delinquencies committed during immaturity. In so holding, the court gave a logical extension to the effect of the
decision last year in People v. Klemick.2 4
By its decision in People v. Montana,25 declaring the
1941 amendment to the Parole Act2 unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court indicated that the so-called "recommendation" of the trial court fixing minimum and maximum limits
on the penalty for crime was not objectionable as tending to
make the sentence indefinite.2 7 It did, however, declare that
administrative review and modification of such recommendation would be highly improper as calling for the exercise
of judicial functions by a non-judicial body. In restoring the
former statute to operation, the court is, though, really sanctioning the exercise by the Department of Public Welfare of
powers greater than it possessed under the 1941 amendment
22

382 111. 213, 46 N.E. (2d) 929 (1943).

IlM.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 393.
(2d) 846 (1941), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEw 43.
25 380 IMl. 596, 44 N.E. (2d) 569 (1942), noted in 43 Col. L. Rev. 385.
26 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 560; 11. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 802.
27 People ex rel. Hinckley v. Pirfenbrink, 96 Ill. 68 (1879).
23

24 311 Ill. App. 508, 36 N.E.
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since it may, by a simple majority vote, 28 accomplish what,
by the terms thereof, required the approval of four out of
five members. Further revision of the statute, effective
July 1, 1943, now permits the court to fix minimum and
maximum limits on the penalty and confines the power of
the department to commute sentence to that of reducing the
maximum, but not below the minimum, sentence so fixed.2 9
V. FAMILY LAW

While the Illinois Marriages Act provides that a female
between 16 and 18 may secure a license to marry if the
parent or guardian of such person shall give consent,' it
contains no statement as to the consequence of failure to
obtain such consent. As applied to a marriage contracted in
Illinois, it has been held that the mere omission of parental
consent is not enough to warrant annulment 2 since such provision is regarded as directory and not mandatory. A somewhat similar provision in Missouri 3 was given a similar construction4 in Walker v. Walker,5 hence annulment was denied to a female resident of Illinois, between 17 and 18, who
had gone to that state to be married and who predicated her
action solely on the fact she was under 18 at the time and
lacked parental consent. On the other hand, the quantum of
proof necessary to establish the existence of a valid marriage has been made a matter of some doubt by the decision
in Murrelle v. Industrial Commission6 in which the widow's
positive assertion that she had been married before a justice
of the peace at Waukegan, though lacking in details, was
held sufficient to establish that fact, even though the county
records were silent and some five justices, the county clerk,
and three of his deputies gave negative testimony. In the
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 802. It is true that release or commutation of
sentence had to be concurred in by the Governor.
29 Laws 1943, p.-, S.B. No. 17; IM. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 802.
1 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 89, § 3.
2 Reifschneider v. Reifschneider, 241 IMl. 92, 89 N.E. 255 (1909).
3 Rev. Stat. Mo., 1939, § 3370.
4 The court could find no judicial interpretation of the pertinent provision in
Missouri, but distinguished Cox v. Denney, 224 Mo. App. 1047, 34 S.W. (2d) 528
(1931); In re Guthery's Estate, sub nom. Guthery v. Wetzel, 205 Mo. App. 664, 226
S.W. 626 (1920); and Spears v. De Clue, (Mo. App.) 133 S.W. (2d) 1044 (1939).
5 316 Ill. App. 251, 44 N.E. (2d) 937 (1942).
6 382 Ill. 128, 46 N.E. (2d) 1007 (1943).
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earlier case of Brainard v. Brainard7 almost identical negative testimony was held to justify a decision that a marriage
ceremony had never, in fact, occurred despite the woman's
positive testimony, even more detailed, that one had been
performed. Though findings of fact may vary in given cases,
the incongruous holdings on almost parallel testimony should
serve to warn that the safest proof of a marriage lies in a
8
complete public record thereof.
The separate legal identity of the spouses and the independence of their individual property rights as against one
another or against third persons has become generally well
established since the adoption of the Married Women's Acts. 9
Occasionally, however, the concept that the family is to be
regarded as a unity, so that the acts of one member should
serve to bind the other, creeps into law.' 0 It was, perhaps,
on that theory that the bank, in Joseph v. Carter," contended
that the application of funds in its possession belonging to
the wife toward the payment of a note signed by both husband and wife served to revive the husband's obligation
otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. This contention was, however, rejected as it was held that neither
spouse, as such, is agent for the other hence the conduct of
one in making or suffering part payment of the obligation in
no way changed the other spouse's liability. The ordinary
12
rules as to joint obligees were, therefore, applied.
Marital misconduct of sufficient degree to warrant a divorce is also sufficient to support a decree for separate maintenance. 8 The innocent spouse is, therefore, provided with
a choice of remedies. Legislation designed to place limitations on the latter remedy in favor of the former has been
declared unconstitutional. 4 A judicial attempt to coerce the
7 373 Ill. 459, 26 N.E. (2d) 856 (1940).
8 The statutory requirements are sufficiently broad, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 89,
§§ 9-14, but human failure to observe these mandates is the cause of the difficulty.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 68, § 1-21.
10 See, for example, O'Haran v. Leiner, 306 Il. App. 230, 28 N.E. (2d) 315 (1940),
noted in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 202.
11 382 Ill. 461, 47 N.E. (2d) 471 (1943), reversing 314 Ill. App. 630, 42 N.E. (2d)
321 (1942).
12 Kallenbach v. Dickinson, 100 Ill. 427, 39 Am. Rep. 47 (1881).
is Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, § 1, with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 68, § 22.
14 DeMotte v. DeMotte, 364 Ill. 421, 4 N.E. (2d) 960 (1936). See also Zacharias,
Suggested Divorce Reforms for Illinois, 15 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 113.
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litigant into suing for absolute divorce rather than separate
maintenance was likewise criticised in Holmstedt v.
Holmstedt,5 the Supreme Court pointing out that the judge's
personal views on the desirability of absolute divorce in
preference to the more limited kind would have to yield to
the pronounced public policy of the state evidenced by a
choice of remedies.
The flurry of reform against "heart balm" litigation
which originated in Indiana in 1935 and induced the Illinois
legislature to enact a statute making it criminal to institute
suits based upon alienation of affections, criminal conversation, or breach of promise to marry, or to name a correspondent in any divorce case, 6 has been brought to a rather
17
abrupt end by the decision in People v. Mahumed. In holding that the sections dealing with the naming of a correspondent"8 were unconstitutional as not being sufficiently
referred to in the title of the statute, 9 the court has indirectly cast doubt upon the validity of the remaining sections
since they appear open to the same criticism. In failing to
observe a potential connection between the threat to name
a person as correspondent in a divorce suit, thus exposing
such individual to obliquy without chance of defense, 20 and
blackmail, the present court seems to be acting rather
naively. 21 By disposing of the case on that issue, however,
it avoided for the present the more serious constitutional
22
question growing out of the decision in Ex parte Young.
The awarding of alimony in divorce cases gave rise to
three unusual decisions during the current year. In one,
Williams v. Williams, 2 the ex-husband attempted to
compel his divorced wife to furnish an account of her
290, 49 N.E. (2d) 25 (1943).
15 383 Ill.
16 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, §§ 246.1-246.6.
17 381 Ill. 81, 44 N.E. (2d) 911 (1942). See note in 38 Ill. L. Rev. 94 on the current status of such legislation.
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, §§ 246.3, 246.4, and 246.5.
19 The statute is said to be one "in relation to certain causes of action condu" See Laws, 1935, p. 716.
cive to extortion and blackmail ..
20 Leland v. Leland, 319 Ill. 426, 150 N.E. 270 (1926).
21 An earlier court admitted the potency of the argument that to deny the correspondent the right to intervene would be apt to open the door to blackmail, but
said the argument was one to be addressed to the legislature. See Leland v.
Leland, 319 Ill. 426 at 432, 150 N.E. 270 at 272.
22 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908).
23 316 Ill. App. 6, 44 N.E. (2d) 63 (1942).
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handling of moneys paid for alimony and the support of their
children pursuant to decree. Though no charge of waste or
misapplication of the funds was made, the petitioner sought
to compel accounting on the theory that a trust relation existed2 4 requiring the keeping of accounts and the filing of reports
showing receipts and disbursements. Failing to find precedent to support such a request, the majority of the court
denied relief since neither the statute 25 nor the decree contained any such requirement. Statutory provisions requiring
bonds, verified reports, and accountings by guardians were
held inapplicable to the situation. Upon rehearing, one judge
dissented on the ground that since the law compelling a parent to support his children was settled, a correlative duty to
protect the children from the dishonesty or extravagance of
their custodian was imposed. He also pointed out that unless
an accounting was ordered, it would be practically impossible
for the petitioner to demonstrate waste or misapplication
of the funds, hence such an allegation should not be regarded
as essential. In another, Wright v. Wright,26 it was held that
peaceful efforts made out of court to induce the defendant to
pay alimony pursuant to the terms of a decree would not
justify the allowance of attorney's fees even though petitioner
had hired the services of a lawyer for that purpose. Court
action, as by citation for contempt of court, was deemed
essential to impose such additional liability.2 7
Alimony has been declared not to be a "debt" dischargable in bankruptcy 2 at least so far as the ex-spouse who is
obligated to pay the same is concerned. It would, therefore,
seem to follow that the right to receive alimony could not be
regarded as a "credit" or "asset" of the recipient.2 9 It was
held in In re Fiorio, ° however, that alimony in gross, though
payable under the terms of a divorce decree, was an asset
of the person to whom it was payable hence passed to the
24 In support thereof petitioner relied on language found in Stonehill v. Stonehill,
146 Ind. 445, 45 N.E. 600 (1896), and Hutchinson v. Wood, 59 Ind. App. 537, 109 N.E.
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, § 19.
794 (1915).
26 317 Ill. App. 607, 47 N.E. (2d) 347 (1943).
27 Slezak v. Slezak, 293 Ill. App. 489, 13 N.E. (2d) 91 (1938).
See also Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 21 S. Ct. 735,
28 11 U.S.C.A. § 35.
45 L. Ed. 1009 (1901).
See
29 It may, for tax purposes, be treated as "income" subject to taxation.
30 128 F. (2d) 562 (1942), noted in 31 11. B. J. 251.
26 U.S.C.A. § 22(k).
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decree creditor's trustee in bankruptcy. While a lump-sum
settlement may be regarded as a contractual obligation enforcible as such,"' it should be remembered that when the
provisions of the settlement are incorporated in the decree,
so as to be enforcible by contempt proceedings, such settlement is as open to revision as would be the customary provision for periodic payments.2 It would seem to follow, then,
that to the extent such alimony remains unpaid it is contingent both in amount and likelihood of payment 33 hence hardly
capable of treatment as an "asset."
The rights and liabilities of infants also received consideration by the courts. Thus an unsigned agreement
of adoption was specifically performed in Soelzer v. Soelzer 4
upon a rather unusual set of facts. Most such agreements
are oral in nature, but the existence of a written form of
agreement signed by the foundling association, though not
signed by the alleged adopting parent, was held to be sufficient evidence of the contract when supported by evidence
of declarations that adoption had occurred, the making of a
will subsequently destroyed referring to the child as "my
daughter," and a record of over forty years of intimate family
association. The argument that the written memorandum
was merely evidence of an offer to permit adoption acceptable within a period of sixty days but never in fact accepted,
was disposed of on the ground that long acquiescence and
overt acts may demonstrate acceptance as effectively as
would attaching a signature.
Some clarification of the problem of the tort liability of
3 which dea minor was also provided by Palmer v. Miller"
feated an attempt to hold an infant possessor of an automobile for the negligence of his companion who was driving
the car with the infant's permission. Since liability in such
a situation must rest upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, the court concluded that, as the infant could not create
a binding agency relationship, the negligence of the driver
could not be imputed to him. Left undetermined, since not
31 Kohler v. Kohler, 316 Ill. 33, 146 N.E. 476 (1925).
82 Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N.E. 820 (1925).

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, § 19.
34 382 Ill. 393, 47 N.E. (2d) 458 (1943).
380 Ill. 256, 43 N.E. (2d) 973 (1942), reversing 310 IlM. App. 582, 35 N.E. (2d)
104 (1941), noted in 21 CicAo-KEwT LAw RLVIw 195, 31 IM. B.J. 355.
33

35
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present under the facts of the case, was the question of the
responsibility of a minor riding in the car at the time of the
accident and exercising control over the driver so that the
latter's negligence might be imputable to the former. 6
VI. PROPERTY
REAL PROPERTY

Apparently there is no end to the possibility of employing
such original terminology in a deed or a devise so as to call
for the application of the rule in Shelley's case in order to
determine the extent of the interest taken by the grantee or
devisee. In Porter v. Cutler,' for example, the devise read:
"I will, devise and bequeath unto my daughter, Flora
Cashman. . . To have and to hold unto the said Flora Cashman for and during the term of her natural life, the remainder
to the heirs of the said Flora Cashman living at the death of
the said Flora Cashman." In an action for partition brought
by the heirs of Flora Cashman against the defendant who,
after several mesne conveyances, had purchased the property following foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the
named devisee, the Supreme Court held the devise created a
fee simple title in the devisee. The court stated that while
it had held that a somewhat similar devise created only a
life estate, because either the date at which the heirs of the
life tenant were to be determined was such that it could
not designate the whole line of inheritable succession 2 or
else the limitation on the words "heirs of the body" showed a
plain intention on the part of the testator to use them as
words of purchase rather than words of limitation,' still in
the devise in question the words "heirs of the said Flora
Cashman living at the death of the said Flora Cashman" included all the persons upon whom the law would in the
first instance cast inheritance upon the death of the named
person, hence a fee simple title passed.
In another case, that of Lydick v. Tate,4 the testator's
On this point, see Wilson v. Moudy, 22 Tenn. App. 356, 123 S.W. (2d) 828 (1939).
1 380 Ill. 215, 43 N.E. (2d) 929 (1942), noted in 31 Ill. B. J. 286, 37 Ill. L. Rev. 369.
2 Churchill v. Marr, 300 Ill. 302, 133 N.E. 335 (1921).
3 Bunn v. Butler, 300 Ill. 269, 133 N.E. 246 (1921).
4 380 Ill. 616, 44 N.E. (2d) 583 (1942), noted in 43 Col. L. Rev. 398, 31 IMI.B. J.
pp. 236 and 324, and 10 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 344.
86

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1942-1943

will provided that: "I give, devise and bequeath to Ellen Tate
my beloved daughter during her widowhood . . . to have and
to hold for and during her natural life, and at her death or
remarriage the said land shall descend to her heirs." She
remarried before the testator's death, but did survive him.
By her will she purported to devise the property thus acquired to two of her sons who survived her. Upon her death,
the heirs of a deceased son of the named devisee claimed an
interest in the property contending that Ellen's remarriage
terminated her life estate or prevented it from ever becoming vested, so that, as a consequence, an interest in the
property fell to their deceased parent. The Supreme Court
in affirming a decree dismissing such contention, however,
held that the rule in Shelley's case applied. The court recognized that while it is true, for the purpose of ascertaining
the effect and operation of a will, the same must be regarded
as speaking from the date of the death of the testator,' yet
for the purpose of ascertaining the testator's intention a will
must necessarily be considered as of the date of its
execution." It therefore concluded that the testator had not
intended that Ellen would remarry before his death as he
was eighty-two years of age at the time of making the will,
but that it was not necessary that the precedent life estate
become vested in the first taker in order to bring a devise
within the rule in Shelley's case.
The extent of the interest in land acquired by a public or
quasi-public corporation upon condemnation was involved in
three cases. In one of them, Sanitary District of Chicago
v. Manasse7 the question arose as to whether the Sanitary
District, which by statute may acquire property in that fashion and is authorized to dispose of the same when no longer
required,8 could convey a fee simple title thereto. It was
held that it could since its authority was not limited to merely
acquiring an easement for right of way as is the case with
railroads.' In Farmers Grain & Supply Company of Warsaw
v. Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad0 and also in Cleve5 Levings v. Wood, 339 Ill. 11, 170 N.E. 767 (1930).
6 Knight v. Knight, 367 Ill. 646, 12 N.E. (2d) 649 (1938).
7 380 Ill. 27, 42 N.E. (2d) 543 (1942), noted in 10 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 91, 8 J. Marsh.
L. Q. 119.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 42, § 327.
9 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 13.
10 316 Ill. App. 116, 44 N.E. (2d) 77 (1942), noted post, p. 92.
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land, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company v.
Central Illinois Public Service Company,1 however, the court
held that because a railroad does not usually own its right of
way in fee simple, but has only an easement therein, it cannot
prevent a stranger from constructing fixtures over and
across the right of way so long as the latter provides the
minimum clearance over the tracks which is demanded by
the Illinois Commerce Commission.
It again became necessary for the court to remind the
property owner that he may not, by a conveyance to himself and another, expect to create a valid joint tenancy. Argument in Porter v. Porter2 that the clear intention of the
grantor should be regarded as controlling was rejected as
inconsistent with fundamental principles of law. 13
Little of significance has been decided concerning the
rights of landlord and tenant. In the case of Hollywood Building Corporationv. Greenview Amusement Company 4 it appeared that defendant had been occupying plaintiff's theater
under a fifteen-year lease. By Section 1 of Article IV of the
lease defendant was required to comply with all health and
police regulations to the extent of making changes, structural or otherwise, costing not to exceed $1,000 in any one
year or a total of $10,000 for the complete term. Included
with the demised premises was a street canopy and sign
which extended fourteen feet from the building to the edge
of the then sidewalk. During the period of the lease, the municipality widened the public street on which the theater
fronted by reducing the width of the sidewalk. As a consequence, the canopy and sign thereafter extended beyond the
sidewalk and over the roadbed by some six feet. The pertinent municipal ordinance 15 required that no sign or canopy
erected prior to a street widening should extend more than
three feet beyond the new curb. On the question as to whether
the defendant's refusal to remodel the canopy constituted a
default justifying suit for possession of the demised premises,
11 380 Ill. 130, 43 N.E. -(2d) 993 (1942), noted post, p. 92.
381 IMl. 322, 45 N.E. (2d) 635 (1943), noted in 38 Ill. L. Rev. 104. Fulton, J..
dissented without opinion.
13 Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 IlM. 437, 164 N.E. 327, 62 A.L.R. 511 (1928).
14 315 IlM.App. 658, 43 N.E. (2d) 566 (1942).
15 Municipal Code of Chicago, Ch. 86, § 66, as amended December 21, 1939.
12
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the court held that the changes required by the widening
came within the words "structural or otherwise" as contained in the lease.
The nature of war-time emergency is reflected in certain
amendments to the statutory property law of this state made
by the recent session of the legislature. Thus conveyances
made by persons in the armed services may now be acknowledged before any commissioned officer, 16 and persons
relying on a duly recorded power of attorney given by a
service man are not required to ascertain whether he be then
living unless prior thereto written revocation of such power
has been recorded. 17 A new statute regulates the termination of powers of appointment, 8 and the provision against
accumulations has been made expressly inapplicable to the
creation of trusts for the perpetual care of burial places. 19
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS

The usual form of mortgage on improved property contains a covenant requiring the mortgagor to insure the
premises for the benefit of the mortgagee, in which case the
proceeds of such insurance are available for the benefit of
the mortgagor, in case loss arises, by way of rehabilitating
the premises 0 or by reducing the mortgage indebtedness. 2 ' The interest of the mortgagee, however, is a separate
one which he may insure if he so sees fit. If he should so
insure, a question might well arise as to whether the proceeds could then inure to the benefit of the mortgagor as by
way of discharge of the debt. Such, in fact, was the case of
22 where it was held that the mortLeDoux v. Dettmering
gagor's refusal to insure, pursuant to covenant, should deny
him the right to claim satisfaction of the mortgage when the
mortgagee later collected the proceeds of insurance taken
out at the mortgagee's own expense. The claim that the insurance company would not lose anything by insuring the
16 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 42; Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 30, § 19.
17 Laws 1943, p.-, S.B. No. 273; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 30, § 27a. Similar provision has been made for property registered under the Torrens System: Laws
1943, p.-, S.B. No. 272; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 30, § ll1a.
18 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 403; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 30, § 177 et seq.
19 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 311; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 30, § 153.
20 See note on this point in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REVIEW 265.
21 Fergus v. Wilmarth, 117 Il. 542, 7 N.E. 508 (1886).
22 316 I1. App. 98, 43 N.E. (2d) 862 (1942), noted in 31 IlM. B. J. 331.
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mortgagee's interest, since upon payment of the loss it would
step into his position as holder of the mortgage, was held to
be beside the point.
Much has been written upon the right to a deficiency
decree upon mortgage foreclosure as well as the enforcement thereof, but the Illinois Supreme Court held for the first
time, this year, in the case of Johnson v. Zahn" that such
decree cannot be used as the basis of levy upon, and sale of,
the mortgagor's statutory right of redemption in the mortgage premises. It may, therefore, only be used as the basis
of reaching his interest in other property. For that matter,
the holder of a deficiency judgment is limited to the right
to secure satisfaction thereof from the unpaid proceeds of a
condemnation of part of the mortgaged premises according
to the holding in City of Chicago v. Salinger.2 4 The fact
that the mortgagee decree-creditor had purchased the balance of the premises at his own sale and later perfected title
thereto was held insufficient to give him the right to the entire
condemnation proceeds since the prior eminent domain suit
had relieved the part taken from the lien of the mortgage
and no interest therein passed under the foreclosure decree
and sale. Had foreclosure preceded condemnation, the result could well have been just the opposite.2 5
Echoes of dissatisfaction by individual bondholders with
the work done by reorganization committees can be found in
Chicago Trust Company v. Dorchester Terrace Building
Corporation26 in which a bondholder petitioned to compel an
assignment of her aliquot portion of a deficiency judgment,
rendered in favor of the trustee for the benefit of the bondholders, so that she might effectuate a redemption from the
foreclosure sale as a judgment creditor.2 7 Admitting that
there was no decision justifying such relief,28 the bondholder
23 380 Ill. 320, 44 N.E. (2d) 15 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAw
201, 31 Ill. B. J. 328.
24 317 Ill. App. 542, 47 N.E. (2d) 725 (1943), noted post, p. 94.
25 Wadelski v. 16th Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Ill. App. 74 (1934).
26 317 Ill. App. 293, 45 N.E. (2d) 1001 (1943).
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27 It appeared that the premises had been sold to a stranger for the meager
sum of $2450, which amount was insufficient to cover the expenses of the foreclosure leaving nothing to apply on the principal debt for which an aggregate
deficiency judgment in the amount of $223,375.13 had been rendered.
28 The court distinguished Nudelman v. Carlson, 375 Ill. 577, 32 N.E. (2d) 142
(1941), on the ground that the redemption there made was predicated upon a
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claimed that equity should devise one for her benefit. In
rejecting such petition as being based upon a desire to secure
special benefit for herself rather than for the benefit of all
the bondholders, the court indicated that the remedy, if one
existed, lay in compelling the trustee to perform its duty. To
permit fractional assignment of the deficiency judgment, the
court said, would have created an intolerable situation.
While Section 30 of the Judgments and Decrees Act"
requires that the holder of a certificate of sale under mortgage foreclosure must secure a deed within five years from
the expiration of the time of redemption, it says nothing
about the time of recording such deed. It was, therefore,
held in Miller v. Bullington ° that a master's deed issued in
apt time was valid even though not placed of record until
four years after the time when, according to such statute, it
would have been too late to secure such a deed. Possession
by the purchaser holding the unrecorded deed was treated as
sufficient notice to the world of his rights thereunder.
The right of a sub-contractor to a mechanics' lien for
form work used in concrete construction was before the court
in Douglas Lumber Company v. Chicago Home for Incurables,31 in which case the court upheld the lien claim
against the contention that Section 21 of the Mechanics'
Lien Act 3 2 was unconstitutional as being vague, indefinite,
and discriminatory. The further contention that the prime
contract was illegal because made with an unlicensed general
contractor, hence furnished no valid basis for a lien, was rejected insofar as the sub-contractor was concerned since
there was no showing that it either actually or constructively
knew of the purported illegality. The court intimated that
even had the sub-contractor been unlicensed the same result
would have been achieved, since it regarded the violation of
the licensing provision as a matter between the municipality
and the sub-contractor rather than one of public policy deseparate judgment obtained by a bondholder based on a note given by mortgagor,
rather than as the holder of a fractional part of a deficiency judgment granted
upon the trust deed.
29 fI. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 77, § 31.
80 381 IMl. 238, 44 N.E. (2d) 850 (1942).
81 380 Ill. 87, 43 N.E. (2d) 535 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RLEVIW

199.
82

111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 82, § 21.
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signed to render contracts in violation thereof absolutely void.
Though such intimation was purely dictum, the attitude expressed would hardly seem to stand analysis.3
Trust receipt financing is a relatively new device in Illinois, the uniform statute on the subject 3 4 having been adopted
as late as 1935. Questions as to priority of lien have arisen
thereunder,33 but the clearest exposition of the rights of the
creditor advancing funds on trust receipt had to await the
decision in Donn v. Auto Dealers Investment Company."
It appeared therein that two lenders, not knowing of the
existence of the other, had loaned funds on the same automobile each taking a trust receipt thereon. When a dispute
arose as to priority of lien, one contended that the earlier
filing of notice of intention to engage in trust receipt transactions3 7 was sufficient to give him priority, while the other
contended that the time of actual advancement of funds was
controlling in determining priority of lien. It was held that
the purpose of the filing of a statement of intention was to
give warning of an inchoate security interest in the property
which would, upon the actual extension of credit, become
choate and relate back to the date of such filing. As a consequence, priority of lien was accorded to the person who first
filed the required statement of intention.
The legislature responded to the decision in Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Company v. Klauder,38 which
declared the assignment of open accounts receivable invalid
as to creditors of the assignor when no notice of the fact of
assignment had been given, by providing a new statute expressly declaring such assignments valid and providing for
priority in point of time.3 9 The suggestion that some form of
recording system would be desirable 0 was disregarded.
33 See 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 199, particularly p. 201 and cases there
cited.
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121 , §§ 166-87.
35 See, for example, Middleton v. Commercial Inv. Corp., 301 Ill. App. 242, 22
N.E. (2d) 723 (1939).
36 318 Ill. App. 95, 47 N.E. (2d) 56B (1943), noted post, p. 99.
37 IIl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121 , § 178.
38 318 U.S. 434, 63 S. Ct. (adv.) 679, 87 L. Ed. (adv.) 632 (1943), noted in 21
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 253.
39 Laws 1943, p.-, S.B. No. 536; I1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121 , H 220-222.
40 See 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 255, particularly notes 16-18.
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TRUSTS

The most important development in trust law this year
is the enactment by the legislature of the Common Trust
Fund Act.41 The statute represents an effort to solve one of
the difficult investment problems of the corporate trustee. It
has become increasingly difficult to find desirable investments for smaller trusts, due largely to changes in methods of financing brought about by depression and war.4
Courts have been reluctant to permit trustees, without special authorization by the settlor, to mingle funds of different
trusts or to create investment pools. Valuation and liquidation difficulties were responsible in large part for this
reluctance.
The present statute applies alike to trusts created before
and those created after its effective date. In substance the
act permits any corporate fiduciary to establish, maintain
and administer one or more common trust funds, and to
invest funds which it holds for investment as fiduciary in
such common trust funds unless such investment is forbidden
by the trust instrument or some amendment thereto. The
power to invest is subject to the qualification that the funds
so held for investment can be properly invested in the investments which are to become part of the common trust
fund.43 Where there is a co-trustee, his consent to the investment is required and the act authorizes him to consent."
A common trust fund is defined by the act as "a fund
maintained by a bank or trust company exclusively for the
collective investment and reinvestment of moneys contributed thereto by the bank or trust company in its capacity as
a fiduciary or co-fiduciary. 4 5 Every such plan must be established and administered according to the terms of a written plan which shall set forth: (1) the manner in which the
fund is to be operated, (2) the investment powers of the corporate fiduciary, including the character and kind of investments which may be purchased, (3) the allocation and
41

Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 413; IlM.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16

42

See Nylund, Investments by Trustees, 20
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(1942).
43 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 413; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16 , § 59.
4 Ibid.
45 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 413; IM. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16 , § 58(c).
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apportionment of income, profits and losses, (4) the terms of
admission or withdrawal of investments or participations, (5)
provisions for auditing and settling accounts, (6) the methods
of valuation to be used, (7) provisions for the termination
of the fund, and (8) other matters necessary or proper to
define clearly the rights of participants. A copy of the plan
is required to be available at all reasonable times for the
inspection of any person having an interest. 8
Other provisions deal in detail with the administration
and management of such funds. Audits are required at least
once each year and no corporate trustee may charge a
special fee to any participating trust in addition to its regular
compensation.4 7 Under the act, no participating interest is
negotiable or assignable, nor can any participating trust have
any interest in any particular asset.4"
The case law of trusts has not shown any extraordinary
development during the year. In National Casualty Company
v. Caswel 49 the Appellate Court decided that a dealer in
investment securities who purchased a certificate of deposit
in good faith from a trustee, which certificate was endorsed
by the trustee in his fiduciary capacity, and who paid the
trustee by a check to the order of the trustee individually,
was not liable even though the trustee subsequently misappropriated the proceeds. The decision was based on Section
2 of the Fiduciary Obligations Act."
The late economic depression is still producing litigation
concerning the acts of trustees. One such case appeared in
the Appellate Court during the year. In Hatfield v. First
National Bank of Danville,51 the court refused to hold a
successor trustee liable for losses by its predecessor in retaining bank stock received as part of the original res. The
court said: "A wisdom developed after an event and having
it and its consequences as its5 2 direct source, is a standard
no man should be judged by.
A third case containing a point of interest is that of
Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 413; IlM.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16 , U60.
Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 413; IlM.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch, 16 , U61.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16 , § 62.
Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 413; Ill.
49 317 Ill.
App. 66, 45 N.E. (2d) 698 (1942).
50 Ill.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 98, § 235.
51 317 fll. App. 169, 46 N.E. (2d) 94 (1943).
App. 169 at 178, 46 N.E. (2d) 94 at 99.
52 317 Ill.
46

47
48
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Williams v. Northern Trust Company5 8 in which the Northern Trust Company, as trustee, executed a contract for the
sale of land to the plaintiff. By the terms of the contract,
the earnest money was held in escrow by the Northern Trust
Company. In a suit to recover the earnest money, the defendant trustee contended that the plaintiff-buyer had breached
the contract. The court recognized the dual capacity of the
Northern Trust Company, as bank and as trustee, so far
as to allow it, in its capacity as bank, to maintain a counterclaim in the nature of interpleader. Courts ordinarily have
refused to recognize the departments of banks as separate
entities, but in most such cases the problem has arisen in
connection with the buying or selling of assets between the
trust and the commercial departments, or the deposit of trust
money in the commercial department. For the purpose of
this interpleader, however, the two departments were seemingly regarded as separate entities without any full discussion of the point.
Perhaps still another case should be mentioned. In Jack5 4 the Supreme Court held that a trust which
son v. Pillsbury,
provided for a division of the trust res among named beneficiaries upon the death of the life beneficiary but did not
direct the trustee to convey, became passive upon the death
of the life beneficiary and was, therefore, executed by the
Statute of Uses.5 5
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

During the past year cases involving the construction of
wills have been numerous, but for the most part such cases
are without general interest. Some new points, however,
have been established concerning the administration of
estates. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Masin
v. Bassford,56 upheld the validity of Section 90 of the
Probate Act 7 which reduces the time within which an interested person may file a suit to contest a domestic or
foreign will. The court pointed out that will contest cases
53 316 Ill. App. 148, 44 N.E. (2d) 333 (1942).
54 380 IR. 554, 44 N.E. (2d) 537 (1942).
55 See comment on the case in 37 IlM. L. Rev. 367 for a suggested distinction
between apparently conflicting cases on this point.
56 381 Ill. 569, 46 N.E. (2d) 366 (1943).
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 242.
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are statutory proceedings; that the right of contest is not a
vested right; hence the period within which the privilege
might be exercised is properly subject to statutory change
and regulation. The elimination of the provision found in
the former act, giving to "infants and non compos mentis,
the like period after the removal of their respective disabilities, '5 8 was also regarded as being wholly within legislative
power.
The same court, in In re Estate of Blyman, 59 rejected
the contention that a court of this state having probate jurisdiction is without power to set aside its order, after thirty
days have elapsed, denying probate to a will because of the
discovery of a later will, particularly when the later will
is subsequently determined to be spurious. While the court
conceded that an order allowing or disallowing probate is
a final and conclusive one unless reversed on appeal, 60 it
held such rule inapplicable to the situation presented in that
case since no conclusive order could be entered upon the
earlier will until it had been finally determined whether or
not the same had been effectively revoked by the later purported will.
More light has been thrown upon the method of proving
an agreement to make mutual wills by the decision in Durbin
v. Durbin.61 The court there indicated that the mere fact
that the wills were identical in form and date of execution,
and that each testator left the entire estate to the other, did
not establish a presumption of an agreement to make mutual
wills, but such agreements must be established "by the clear-'
est and most convincing evidence."" '
A matter of first impression is the decision in Lewis v.
Hill 3 where sale of real estate by a conservator of the estate
of an incompetent person, which land had previously been
made the subject of a specific devise in a will made by the
ward before becoming incompetent, was held not to adeem
the specific devise. It should be noted, however, that the
proceeds of sale were traceable and no part thereof had been
58
59
60
61

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 148, § 7.
382 IM. 520, 47 N.E. (2d) 710 (1943).
In re Matter of Storey, 120 II. 244, 11 N.E. 209 (1887).
315 Il1. App. 238, 42 N.E. (2d) 964 (1942).
62 315 Ill. App. 238 at 241, 42 N.E. (2d) 964 at 966.
63 317 Il1. App. 531, 47 N.E. (2d) 127 (1943).
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used for the support of the ward, so the court had no difficulty in holding that such proceeds in the hands of the executor-conservator were impressed with a trust and upon distribution should be paid to the specific devisee.
Of considerable importance is the case of In re Estate of
Muldoon 4 in which it was decided that executors are entitled
to take credit for the payment of general taxes upon real
estate owned by the deceased even though the same were
not due and payable, according to statute, until some time
after the death of the testator.
An unusual decision was rendered in In re Estate of
Schultz 5 wherein it was held necessary that the local court
follow the law of the foreign domicile of the testator as to
legacies to charity even though the personalty bequeathed
was located here, no probate proceedings had been undertaken elsewhere than in Illinois, and the charity-beneficiary
was an Illinois corporation. The case is chiefly interesting
for the strained construction placed by the court upon the
facts as to domicile in determining that decedent was a
resident of California. Upon such finding it was held necessary to apply the law of that state, resulting in a declaration
that the legacy to the local charity was, at least in part,
illegal.
The Illinois Supreme Court has also indicated, through
its decision in In re Elkerton's Estate,66 that the former rule
making it unnecessary for the witnesses to a will to sign in
the presence of each other still continues and is in no way
changed by Section 43 of the Probate Act. 67 Earlier decisions on the subject may, therefore, still be regarded as law.
It was only to be expected that a few years of experience
in the operation of the 1939 revision of the Probate Act would
demonstrate the need for certain amendments. Fourteen such
amendments were made during the recent session of the
legislature. A more complete discussion of these amendments
64 315 Ill. App. 109, 42 N.E.
(2d) 306 (1942), noted in 21 CHiCAGO-KmN-r LAW
RLrvzw 119.
65 316 Ill. App. 540, 45 N.E. (2d) 577 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvw 268. Hebel, J., dissented. Leave to appeal has been granted: 320 Ill. App.,
p. 1, and it is understood that the Supreme Court has reversed the decision of the
Appellate Court though the opinion has not yet been reported. See 32 Ill. B.J. 84.
66 380 Ill. 394, 44 N.E. (2d) 148 (1942), noted in 31 Ill. B.J. 363.
67 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 194.
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may be found elsewhere" so only a brief summary is here
provided. Section 194, which fixes the "claim date," has
been enlarged to permit the court to fix a new claim date
not later than four months after the date of letters. 69 The
age requirement for capacity to make a will has been reduced, as to males, and is now eighteen. 70 The repeal of former Chapter 85 entitled Lunatics 71 and the substitution of a
new Mental Health Act therefor 72 necessitated change in
Sections 113, 127, and 128 of the Probate Act in order to
harmonize the same with the new statute. 7 The donee of a
power of appointment has been authorized to release the
power, in the manner provided, so that the donee may get
the benefit of the federal law relating to the subject. 74 Assistance in the probate of wills is provided by an amendment authorizing the use of handwriting proof in cases of
witnesses in the military or naval services, provided the witness is outside the continental United States. 75 Administration
is made unnecessary where the minor's estate is fully $500,
77
7
rather than under that amount as was heretofore the case.
Public sale of real estate under order of the Probate Court
was heretofore to be conducted between certain hours of
"central standard time.

78

While the hourly period is con-

tinued, the requirement that it be "central standard time"
has been eliminated.7 9 Substantial revision has occurred in
Sections 117, 118a, 122, 140, 152 and 310 of the Probate Act,"
and a new Section 146a has been added,8 ' but these deal
with technical changes for which a fuller explanation may
be found elsewhere."2 The method formerly provided for ex68 See James, New Probate and Trust Legislation, 32 Ill.
B.J. 12.
69 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 196; I1.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 346.
70 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 234; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 193.
71 Il. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 85, § 1 et seq., repealed by Laws 1943, p.-, H.B.
No. 316.
72 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 316; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 913h, § 1 et seq. The
new statute becomes effective Jan. 1, 1944.
78 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 461; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §§ 265, 279 and 280.
74 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 403; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 30, § 177 et seq.
75 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 444; li Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 226.
76 Laws 1943, p.-, S.B. No. 13; M11.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 480.
77 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 480.
78 Il. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 390.
79 Laws 1943, p.- S.B. No. 43; Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3. § 390.
80 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §§ 269, 270a, 274, 292, 304 and 464.
81 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 298a.
82 See James, New Probate and Trust Legislation, 32 Ill.
B.J. 12.
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tinguishing an outstanding inchoate dower interest 3 has
been repealed and a new method established in lieu thereof. 84
One further clarifying amendment may also be noted. The
so-called "conformity clause" in the Probate Act, by which
proceedings thereunder were to be conducted in accordance
with the Civil Practice Act," has been amended so as to
leave no doubt that such is not the case where the sale or
mortgage of real estate by an executor, administrator, guardian, or conservator is involved. 86 Procedure in such cases
is to be conducted in acordance with the special provisions
87
of the Probate Act.
VII. PUBLIC LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Several cases of interest involving constitutional questions were decided during the year, although none of these
cases are of far-reaching importance. One involved the legal
position, as a state instrumentality, of the University of Illinois.' The litigation grew out of a dispute between the Board
of Trustees of the university and the Attorney General over
the question of whether the latter, as chief law officer of
the state, was the sole legal representative of the university.
The Board of Trustees had never authorized the Attorney
General to represent it but had, for several years, employed
a member of the law faculty as University Counsel and another employee as his assistant. The Attorney General directed the Auditor of Public Accounts to cease issuing salary
warrants for these positions. Such conduct resulted in an
original petition for mandamus, brought in the Supreme Court
by the university trustees, to compel the payment of the
salaries. The court reviewed the organization of the
university and its legislative history and decided that the
university was a public corporation possessing the absolute
power, under existing legislation, to do everything necessary
in the management, operation and administration of the uniRev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 189, and Ch. 77, § 14a.
84 Laws 1943, p.-, S.B. No. 282; Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 189.
85 IL Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 3, § 155.
86 Laws 1943, p.-, S.B. No. 321; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 155.
83 1ll.

87

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §§ 381-401.

1 People v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321, 46 N.E. (2d) 951 (1943).
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versity as an educational institution. It was pointed out that
the position of the university among public corporations is
unique in that it is organized but for one specific purpose.
It has no employees, since all those who act for it are employees of the state. Further, it can own no property in its
own right but must hold only as trustee for the state. In view
of its status, the Supreme Court ruled that the university and
its trustees were entitled to be represented by counsel of
their own choice, hence the Attorney General had no right to
do so by virtue of his office. The victory of the trustees was
limited to that principle, however, for the court refused to
order the salaries paid since there had been no appropriation by the legislature for either a University Counsel or an
assistant.
An interesting point regarding due process and the jurisdiction of courts was decided in Bank of Edwardsville v.
Raffaelle,2 in which case scire facias proceedings were
brought to revive a judgment. The defendant had ceased to
be domiciled in Illinois so resort was had to constructive
service by publication. Defendant filed a special appearance
and contended that the court was without jurisdiction since
the proceeding was one in personam, hence to permit the
revival of judgment in that way would violate due process.
The court decided that scire facias proceedings did not constitute a new suit against the defendant to secure an in personam judgment. Bickerdike v. A1len 3 was discussed. In
this early case, it was held that domicile within the state
was prima facie sufficient to authorize constructive service
by publication where the defendant's whereabouts within
the state were unknown. In each case, the defendant was
deemed to have had requisite notice and sufficient opportunity to be heard. The opinion in the Raffaelle case avoids
placing scire facias proceedings to revive a judgment categorically under the "in rem" or "in personam" label. The
result as to due process seems justified on the ground that
it is not unreasonable to require the defendant to know the
status of an unsatisfied judgment against him.
Trading in grain futures, once regarded as illegal gambling in Illinois, received the judicial blessing of validity in
2

381 IMI.486, 45 N.E. (2d) 651 (1943).

3 157 IM. 95, 41 N.E. 740, 29 L.R.A. 782 (1895).
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Albers v. Lamson. Section 132 of the Criminal Code,5 making
gambling illegal, was amended in 1913 to render the section
inapplicable to transactions on a regularly organized board
of trade or commercial stock exchange. This amendment
was held void as being unreasonably discriminatory in Miller
v. Sincere.6 In 1935, the section, as amended, was re-enacted.
In the present litigation, a bank sought to recover bonds
wrongfully used as margin by its president in his grain trading operations on the ground that such transactions were unlawful gambling. The court took note of the fact that the
legislature had legalized betting on horse-racing when carried on in a particular way. It also noted that extensive federal control is exerted over boards of 'trade and exchanges.
In view of these facts, it was decided that public policy had
changed and that the objections to the statute which had been
advanced in the Miller case were no longer valid.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Thomson v. Industrial
Commission,7 discussed the power of Congress to extend the
Federal Employers' Liability Act to employees other than
those engaged in interstate commerce. The patrolman there,
employed by an interstate carrier, was assaulted by trespassers while in the discharge of his duties policing and inspecting the railroad yards with respect to both interstate and
local traffic. The carrier contended that the employee was
subject to the provisions of the federal statute which had
.been amended in 1939 so as to broaden its effect in an effort
to avoid some of the difficulties which had arisen under
earlier decisions." Such cases had held that the act did not
apply unless, at the time of injury, the employee was actually engaged in interstate commerce. The Illinois court, relying
on National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation,9 said the Congress was without power to
extend the act to all employees of interstate carriers without
380 Ill. 35, 42 N.E. (2d) 627 (1942).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 330.
194, 112 N.E. 664 (1916).
273 Ill.
7 380 Ill. 386, 44 N.E. (2d) 19 (1942), noted in 43 Col. L. Rev. 139.
8 After amendment, the statute read: "Any employee of a carrier, any part of
whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign
commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such
commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this chapter." See 45 U.S.C.A. § 51.
9 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937).
4
6
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regard to the character of their duties, although the court
admitted that the statute could be extended to apply to those
whose activities closely and substantially affected interstate
commerce. The conclusion that Congress cannot place all
employees of interstate carriers under federal regulation seems open to serious doubts. In fact, courts in other
states have reached directly contrary conclusions as to the
application of the 1939 amendment. The subject, therefore,
awaits clarification by the federal Supreme Court.
Other cases involving constitutional issues, decided during the year, may be here briefly noted although discussed
elsewhere in this survey. In Stephens v. Kasten"° the provisions of the Civil Practice Act requiring a demand in writing for jury trial, by plaintiff at time of commencing suit
and by defendant at the time of filing appearance, on penalty
of waiver, were sustained as constitutional. In People v. Montana1 the doctrine of separation of powers was deemed to
require a holding that the provision for advisory maximum
and minimum sentences in criminal cases was unconstitutional as vesting judicial power in an administrative body. The
regulation of advertising on motor vehicles operating on boulevards was considered in Chicago Park District v. Canfield, 2 but the ordinance there considered was rejected as
establishing an arbitary and unreasonable classification.
Still another case, that of City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 3
upheld the power of a municipality to install parking meters.
CONFLICT OF LAWS

But two cases involving problems of conflict of laws
were noted during the year. Both of these cases are discussed
elsewhere in this survey. In one, the statute of limitations
question was too clear to require discussion. 4 In the other,
it is understood that a somewhat extraordinary decision of
the Appellate Court as to domicile has since been reversed by
the Supreme Court. 5
10

127, 48 N.E.
383 Ill.
11 380 Ill. 596, 44 N.E.
12 382 Il. 218, 47 N.E.
Is 381 III. 347, 45 N.E.
14 Glenn v. McDavid,
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569 (1942), noted in 43 Col. L. Rev. 385.
61 (1943).
852 (1943).
Ill. App. 130, 44 N.E. (2d) 84 (1942), noted in 21
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15 In re Estate of Schultz, 316 Ill. App. 540, 45 N.E. (2d) 557 (1942), noted in 21
CHICAGo-KENT LAw REVImW 268. For note of reversal, see 32 Ill. B.J. 84.

SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-1942-1943

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Several interesting cases arose involving the liability of
municipalities to firemen and policemen under "minimum
salary" statutes. 6 One such case was that of George v. City
of Danville17 in which it appeared that upon the passage of
such a statute the city, being short of funds, proposed discharging twenty-five members of the fire department. To
prevent this, the firemen agreed to accept a lesser salary
in consideration that none would be discharged but that each
would have less work to do. After this arrangement had been
in force for several years, the firemen repudiated the agreement and sought to recover the difference between the actual
salary paid and that required by the minimum wage law. It
was held that the contract was void as against public policy,
hence the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. 8
9 involved
A like case, that of Kennedy v. City of Joliet,"
the same type of contract except that in addition to the
salary reduction the city provided for a systematic, rotating, thirty-day enforced lay-off period without pay in each
year. The trial court held the arrangement improper and
allowed the plaintiffs a recovery for this lay-off period also.
The Supreme Court, while holding the contract void insofar
as it called for the waiving of the minimum pay requirement, nevertheless denied recovery for the lay-off period
since the municipality had power to suspend firemen and
policemen for short periods without violating the Civil Service Act.2" In Anderson v. City of Jacksonville,2 another
case of this type, the city contended that since the plaintiffs were police officers, as opposed to mere employees, their
salaries could not be increased during their terms of office.
16 IM. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, §§ 11-2 and 12-2.
17 315 IMI. App. 17, 42 N.E. (2d) 300 (1942).
18 The Illinois Supreme Court has since affirmed the decision, 383 Ill. 454, 50
N.E. (2d) 467 (1943), not in the period of this survey. Smith, J., wrote a dissenting opinion predicated on the basis that plaintiffs were guilty of a fraud both
on the city and also on its inhabitants and should not be allowed to retain the
benefits of the contract and repudiate its burdens. A note on the Supreme Court
decision, in 11 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 390, appears to have been based on a report
of the decision furnished in 11 Law Week 2448 which printed only the dissent. The
writer of the note, as a consequence, confuses the dissenting opinion as being the
controlling one.
19 380 Ill. 15, 41 N.E. (2d) 957 (1942).
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24 , § 51.
21 380 lL 44, 41 N.E. (2d) 956 (1942).
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This agrument was also rejected and the plaintiffs were allowed to recover the minimum salary. In Bengson v. City of
Kewanee,2 2 however, an action of mandamus to compel
payment of the statutory minimum salary was denied on the
ground that mandamus was not the proper remedy to collect
the debt from the city at least until the amount thereof had
first been rendered certain by other procedure.
Although several zoning cases arose during the past
year,23 the court adhered to its former position that it would
not act as a zoning commission and, so long as the zoning
ordinance was not arbitrary and did not involve a clear
abuse of discretion, the provisions therein were upheld. In
Zadworny v. City of Chicago,24 a bill in equity by an apartment house owner to enjoin the erection of stores in his block
as permitted by a change in the "use" from apartment to
commercial purposes, the gravamen of the complaint was
that an unreasonable depreciation in values would result.
Finding that the reasonableness of the amendatory ordinance was "fairly debatable," the court declined to interfere.
Exercise of the licensing power was upheld in two instances. In Keig Stevens Baking Company v. City of Savanna25 a small annual license fee charged on motor vehicles used in delivering food within the city, though operated
from without the municipal area, was deemed a valid regulatory measure and not a revenue act. The court held that
the fee charged was not so excessive as to show, on its face,
that it was nonregulatory or unreasonable in relation to the
cost of licensing and inspection. 26 The case of City of Chicago
v. Michalowski27 raised the question as to whether or not the
municipality could prosecute the defendant for moving a dead
human body without a license contrary to city ordinance.
The defendant urged that as the state had required defendant to secure a license to act as a funeral director it had
22

380 Ill. 244, 43 N.E. (2d) 951 (1942).

Burkholder v. City of Sterling, 381 Ill. 564, 46
Village of La Grange, 381 Ill. 432, 45 N.E. (2d) 647
field, 380 Ill. 275, 43 N.E. (2d) 947 (1942).
24 380 111. 470, 44 N.E. (2d) 426 (1942).
25 380 Ill. 303, 44 N.E. (2d) 23 (1942).
26 This point, on a similar ordinance, had been
Baking Co. v. City of Wilmington, 370 Ill. 400, 19
there determined on the pleadings.
27 318 Ill. App. 533, 48 N.E. (2d) 541 (1943).
23

N.E. (2d) 45 (1943); Avery v.
(1943); Neff v. City of Spring-

before the court in American
N.E. (2d) 172 (1939), but was
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pre-empted the field to the exclusion of the municipality.
The court decided, however, that a city might regulate an
occupation already subject to statutory regulation so long
as the municipal ordinance was not inconsistent with, or
repugnant to, the statute.
Traffic regulation was dealt with in two instances. The
validity of an ordinance providing for paid parking meters
28
was before the court in City of Bloomington v. Wirrick,
but was there upheld under the general powers given to
municipalities to regulate the use of streets and also to regulate traffic.2 9 The court noted, in passing, that no question
was raised as to the reasonableness of the charge made.
Another ordinance had at one time prohibited the driving of
vehicles displaying advertising matter along the parkways
and boulevards within the municipal area. It was earlier
held invalid for indefiniteness." After amendment designed
to cure such objection, the same was again before the court
in Chicago Park District v. Canfield l wherein it appeared
that the ordinance exempted taxicabs and common carriers
from its application. This time it was held invalid as involving an unwarranted classification not predicated on any
reasonable grounds, hence was discriminatory.
Mention has been made elsewhere of the case of Hancock
v. Village of Hazel Crest 1 dealing with municipal debt limitation, wherein it was held that such limits apply not only to
contract claims but also to obligations imposed by law of
quasi contractual nature.
The sufficiency of service of notice, required by statute
as a condition precedent to the maintenance of a personal
injury action against a city, 83 was involved in Lutsch V. City
of Chicago. 4 The court held that even though the copy of
such notice left with the city clerk and the corporation counsel
was unsigned still, so long as the original receipted by those
officers at the time of service was available and was signed
28 381 Ill. 347, 45 N.E. (2d) 852 (1942), noted in 31 Ill. B.J. 218.
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, §§ 23-10 and 23-27.
80 Chicago Park District v. Canfield, 370 Ill. 447, 19 N.E. (2d) 376, 121 A.L.R. 557
(1939).
81 382 Ill. 218, 47 N.E. (2d) 61 (1943). Wilson, J., dissented without opinion.
32 318 Ill. App. 170, 47 N.E. (2d) 557 (1943), noted ante, p. 14.
33 IM. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, §§ 1-11 and 1-12.
34 318 Ill. App. 156, 47 N.E. (2d) 545 (1943).
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by the plaintiff's attorney, the statutory requirements were
satisfied. The statute was deemed to be in derogation of the
common law, hence had to be strictly construed against the
city. As a consequence, the court concluded the word "file,"
as used therein, had the same sense as "serve" as understood
by legal circles. The case shows, at least on this point, a
more realistic and liberal attitude by the court than has been
manifested previously.
Extensive amendment of the Cities and Villages Act occurred during the recent session of the legislature. No attempt is made to comment on all such changes. Of principal significance to Chicagoans, however, is the fact that
municipal liability has been declared for injuries caused by
a motor vehicle operated by a policeman in the performance
of his duties. 5 Pension fund and annuity fund provisions
have also been expanded to take in the smaller municipalities
of the state."
PUBLIC UTILITIES

The cases worth mentioning involving questions of public
utility law which may have arisen in the last year are all
transportation cases. Perhaps the most important in the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court is Chicago & West
Towns Railways, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Commission7
wherein the court took occasion to announce that the theory
of public utility regulation in Illinois is one of regulated
monopoly. The case concerned the authority of the Commerce
Commission to grant a certificate of public convenience and
necessity to operate a bus line without first giving existing
carriers operating over the same route an opportunity to
furnish the proposed service if they so desired. It was held,
under such theory, that the Commission possessed no such
authority. A dissent was noted on the ground that the certificate should be denied and existing carriers be given an
opportunity to meet public convenience and necessity only
35 Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. No. 35; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 1-15.
36 See Laws 1943, p.-, S.B. No. 286; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, §§ 892-904b as
to policemen, and Laws 1943, p.-, H.B. 239; M. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § § 918-930
as to firemen. A whole new law as to firemen's annuity and benefit funds in
municipalities between 10,000 and 100,000 population was also enacted. See Laws
1943, p.-, H.B. No. 493; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, §944.66 et seq.
37 383 Ill. 20, 48 N.E. (2d) 320 (1943). Thompson, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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where there was no showing that the public interest would
be better served by a new and competing service.
In another case, 8 the power of the Commission to require a railroad to install water coolers with paper drinking
cups in all cabooses in service in Illinois was upheld. The
court ruled that such an order does not unduly burden interstate commerce under the theory of Wilson v. The Black
Bird Creek Marsh Company 9 and Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia." It was also decided that
there was no inconsistency between the Health and Safety
Act,4 1 granting to the Industrial Commission exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to the health and safety of
employees, and the provisions of the Public Utilities Act authorizing the Commerce Commission to require the adoption
by such utilities of health and safety measures for the benefit
of employees and the public.'
An interesting problem was presented by the action of
the New York Central Railroad Company in eliminating a
portion of the City of Bloomington from its switching district,
thus causing industries in the eliminated section to be subjected to the higher line-haul rate. The Commerce Commission approved the change, but this was held improper. 4 Against the contention that the court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the Commission, the court
said that where the facts are undisputed "their effect, under
the Public Utilities Act, becomes a matter of law, upon which
the court, upon review, may reach an independent conclusion. "144
In another case involving the issuance of a certificate of
public convenience and necessity to operate busses, a procedural question of some importance was decided. 45 In that
case the problem arose as to whether or not the Commerce
Commission should have ordered the consolidation of cases
arising from petitions filed by competing carriers to be allowed to operate over the same route. It was held that the grant8 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 382 Ill. 55, 46
N.E. (2d) 932 (1943).
89 2 Pet. 245, 7 L. Ed. 412 (1829).
40 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851).
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 137.1 et seq.
42 Tbid., Ch. 111-2/3, § 61.
43 Alton R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 382 Ill. 478, 48 N.E. (2d) 381
(1943).
44 382 Ill. 478 at 483, 48 N.E. (2d) 381 at 384.
45 Black Hawk Motor Trans. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 383 Ill. 57,
48 N.E. (2d) 341 (1943).
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ing or refusing of a motion to consolidate rested in the sound
discretion of the Commission. The court said that there was
no reason why this rule, applied by courts to motions for
consolidation, should not be applicable to administrative
bodies clothed with quasi-judicial functions. The Commission's decision, hence, is final unless it has clearly abused
its discretion. The test of a proper consolidation is that
prevailing in equity and depends on the subject matter, rather
than upon the parties as is the case in an action at law.
TAXATION

The most interesting tax point decided during the period
of this survey was involved in the bankruptcy proceeding of
United States v. Reese46 where a claim of the State of Illinois,
based on a real estate tax lien, conflicted with one by the
United States government for past due income taxes. The
claim of the state covered the real estate taxes for 1930-1931
and rested upon a statute which provides that taxes shall be
a first and prior lien "from and including the first day ' of
' 47
April in the year in which the taxes are levied until...paid.
The amount of the tax for the years in question was not
fixed until December 28, 1931, and February 5, 1933,
the claims of the
the meantime,
respectively. In
federal government for income taxes for prior years were
merged in an assessment filed by the Collector of Internal
Revenue on December 7, 1931. It was held that the claim
of the federal government should take priority over the tax
lien of the state. The court did not, however, rest its decision
clearly on the federal statute giving to the federal government priority over all other claims, 4 1 nor on the proposition
that the lien of the state was not perfected until the amount
of the tax became certain, though both points were mentioned. The court finally concluded that, by virtue of the taxing
power of the United States and legislation enacted in pursuance thereof, the government's lien "made specific by
being of record, takes priority over an existing inchoate lien
not liquidated or fixed in amount until after the government's lien attached." 4 9
46
47
48

Sub nor. People of the State of Illinois v. United States, 131 F. (2d) 466 (1942).
Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 697.
49 131 F. (2d) 466 at 470.
31 U.S.C.A. § 191.
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In connection with that case, reference should be made
to In re Estate of Muldoon" where it was held that a
testator's liability for real estate taxes became fixed on April
1st, prior to his death in August of the same year, so that the
executor could properly take credit for the payment of such
tax despite the objection by certain legatees that, as the
taxes had not become due and payable until after testator's
death, they could not be regarded as a personal liability of
the decedent.
In two cases 1 arising under the Retailers' Occupation
Tax Act, 52 the court made it plain that if a review of the
findings of the Department of Finance5 3 is not sought by
certiorari, the taxpayer cannot later raise, in an independent
court proceeding, any questions of law or fact "except those
going to the jurisdiction of the department over the subject
matter or the person." 54 As a consequence, the court refused
to consider a claim by a taxpayer that the notice of assessment was made against a partnership, of which defendant
was a member, and not against him as an individual, and
said "the manner in which the business was being conducted
. . . was an issue of fact before the Department and was
determined by it." 55
The case of Svithiod Singing Club v. McKibbin5 6 is also
of vast importance in the interpretation of the same act. It
was therein held, in substance, that a social club, organized
as a non-profit corporation, which served food and drink to
its members but not to the general public was not subject to
tax by reason of such service. The court felt that the particular club had as its primary object "the promotion of
social intercourse" among its members and the "advancement of the social arts and sciences." The selling of food and
drink was regarded as simply an incident to these primary
objects, so the club was not engaged in the business of selling
50 315 Ill. App. 109, 42 N.E. (2d) 306 (1942), noted in 21 CHIcAGo-KENT LAw
REV w 119.
51 Department of Finance v. Sinclair, 382 Ill. 118, 46 N.E. (2d) 20 (1943); Department of Finance v. Kilbane, 381 Ill. 117, 44 N.E. (2d) 868 (1942).
52 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 440 et seq.
53 Now the Department of Revenue: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 440a.
54 381 Ill. 117 at 119, 44 N.E. (2d) 868 at 870.
55 382 Ill. 118 at 120, 46 N.E. (2d) 20 at 21.
56 381 Ill. 194, 44 N.E. (2d) 904 (1942), noted in 38 Ill. L. Rev. 107.
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tangible personal property at retail as defined in Section 2
of the act.5 7 The court made it perfectly plain, however, that
a so-called "social" club might well be taxable if it developed
that the selling of food, merely incidental in the instant case,
became the primary concern thereof.
In Material Service Corporationv. McKibbin"8 the court
held that, prior to the 1941 amendment of the Retailers'
Occupation Tax Act, construction contractors and materialmen were not subject to the provisions thereof and were engaged in performing a service rather than in the business
of selling tangible personal property at retail. The court reasoned that as the contractor did not "use" the materials, as
meant by the law, the materialman could not be regarded as
selling the same at retail for use and consumption. Since the
amendment, however, the transactions of materialmen are
taxable transactions.5 9
An amendment enacted by the legislature at its recent
session, effective July 1, 1943, makes taxable the mere solicitation of retail sales in this state. 60 The amendment was
undoubtedly the result of the outcome of a series of cases,
three of which were not finally disposed of by the Supreme
Court until later than the period of this survey. In the first of
these cases, Standard Oil Company v. Department of Finance,61 it was held that, under the 1941 amendment, 62 the
mere passage of title to personal property outside the state
did not operate to relieve the transaction from tax where all
other activities connected with the sale occurred in Illinois.
In the other cases, 63 it was held in substance that an out-ofstate vendor who did nothing more than solicit orders in the
state was not engaged in taxable transactions. In each case,
however, the property sold was located out of the state, title
passed outside thereof, and all orders were accepted outside
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 441.
380 IiL. 226, 43 N.E. (2d) 939 (1942).
Laws 1941, I, p. 1079; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 440.
Laws 1943, p.-, S.B. No. 512; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, §440b.
383 Ill.
136, 48 N.E. (2d) 514 (1943).
62 Il.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 120, § 441.
63 Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Wright, 383 Il. 363, 50 N.E. (2d) 508 (1943); Ayrshire
Corp. v. Nudelman, 383 Ill. 345, 50 N.E. (2d) 509 (1943); Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. McKibbin, 383 Ill. 316, 50 N.E. (2d) 505 (1943). Rehearings were denied in all three
cases on September 15, 1943.
57

58
59
60
61
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of Illinois. The factual situations therein were thus radically different from that in the Standard Oil case. The present amendment would now purport64 to make all such transactions constitute taxable activity.
In People's Drug Shop, Inc., v. Moysey, 65 the Appellate
Court properly held that a retailer could not, as a matter of
law, pass the occupational tax on to a purchaser. The tax is
not a "sales" tax but is rather one on the privilege of engaging in a retail business, even though the measurement of
the tax is determined by the gross sales. That, however, does
not change its character, so whether or not the retailer may
pass the tax on to the purchaser, either as a separate item
or as a hidden one, is a matter of private contract between
them. He cannot pass off the same on the consumer as a
true tax.
Several cases have arisen in the general property tax
field. The rule of Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company v. State
Tax Commission6 6 was utilized in two recent cases6 7 wherein
the court held that the Tax Commission, after allocating a
portion of the total value of the railroad's property within the
state to a particular county and after determining the average equalized assessed value of property throughout the
state, could not apply a higher equalizing factor in the particular county because that figure happened to be one used
there by other assessing authorities. It has, therefore, been
definitely established that railroads are to be taxed uniformly throughout the state at the average equalized assessed value regardless of the fact that, in any given county,
the equalizing factor may be higher or lower.
An attempt was made, in People ex rel. Schreiner v.
Courtney,68 to put a stop to the common practice of transferring property burdened with delinquent taxes from one
owner to another through the device of a tax foreclosure suit,
particularly where the amount realized for back taxes was
less than that due and the property was in fact worth sub64 Laws 1943, p.-, S. B. No. 512; l. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, §440b. The amendment is detailed and covers the fact situations minutely.
65 317 I1. App. 370, 45 N.E. (2d) 978 (1943).
66 374 fli. 75, 28 N.E. (2d) 100 (1940).
58, 44 N.E. (2d) 566 (1942);
67 People v. Chicago, M., St. P. & R. Co., 381 Ill.
374, 45 N.E. (2d) 633 (1943).
People v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 381 Ill.
68 380 Il. 171, 43 N.E. (2d) 982 (1942).
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stantially more. 69 The litigant failed to allege collusion on
the part of the public officials, so the court concluded that,
absent such charge, the parties had engaged in no unlawful
activity hence refused to permit suit to recover the difference
between that bid at the foreclosure sale and the amount
70
actually due.
Two cases concerning school districts deserve mention.
In the first, that of School District No. 88 v. Kooper,7 ' it was
held that a school district organized under general law may
sue in its own name, pursuant to Section 275 of the Revenue
Act, 72 to recover the school's portion of delinquent taxes.
The claim had been advanced that suit under that section
was limited to school districts organized under special acts
of the General Assembly. In the other case, that of People
ex rel. Hagler v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Company, 73 the court intimated that Section 94f of the
Schools Act 7" was unconstitutional insofar as it attempted
to permit the inclusion of an area already detached from a
non-high school district. It decided the case, however, on the
narrower ground that the levy should not, in any event, be
proportionately greater in the detached area than in the remaining part of the district.7 5
The Public Utility Tax Act of 1935 was declared unconstitutional in City of Chicago v. Ames. 76 Thereafter a tax77
payer, in People ex rel. City of Highland Park v. McKibbin,
who had made payment "under protest" but who had not
69 It appeared that the vendor acquired the property in 1937 when it had an
assessed value of $13,974, and contracted to sell the property, in 1939, for $30,000
subject only to the 1940 taxes. At that time the delinquent taxes, from 1931 on,
amounted to $16,245.09. Foreclosure proceedings were undertaken by the State's
Attorney on the assurance of a minimum bid of $5,500 which was the amount
actually bid.
70 In another foreclosure case, that of People v. Anderson, 380 Ill. 158, 43 N.E.
(2d) 997 (1942), the court applied the principle that mere inadequacy of price
would not justify reversal of a decree approving the foreclosure sale. Its application was interesting since it appeared therein that certain lots having an estimated value of $300 each were sold for $1.00 each.
71 380 IlM.68, 43 N.E. (2d) 542 (1942).
72 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 756.
73 380 Ill. 120, 43 N.E. (2d) 989 (1942).
74 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 122, § 102f.
75 The attempt there was to levy one-half of the proportionate liability on a
bond issue in the detached area, while spreading the balance in the remaining area
over a greater period of time. A currently disproportionate levy resulted.
76 365 Ill. 529, 7 N.E. (2d) 294 (1937).
77 380 Il1. 447, 44 N.E. (2d) 449 (1942), noted in 56 Harv. L. Rev. 831.
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acted to prevent the transfer of the fund into the state treasury, sued to compel the issuance of a credit memorandum
pursuant to Section 6 of that act7 which provided for the
issuance of such a memorandum whenever taxes were paid
under mistake of fact or of law. Holding that the case should
be treated as one where taxes had been voluntarily paid, the
court said that Section 6 fell with the balance of the statute
since it could not be said that the legislature would have
enacted it if the taxing sections, previously declared unconstitutional, had been eliminated from the start. As a consequence, the taxpayer failed to secure relief. The case is
particularly important not only in relation to payments made
under the Public Utility Tax Act but also for its warning to
taxpayers who have in mind challenging the constitutionality
of any taxing statute. Their only safeguard would seem to
lie in paying the tax under protest and also in filing an injunction suit to preserve the identity of the fund.
TRADE REGULATION

Prior decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court 79 have indicated an acceptance of the so-called "palming off" doctrine
in cases of alleged unfair competition. Under that doctrine,
the trade name or common-law trade mark of one person
could not be protected from appropriation by another unless
the latter was in competition with the former, for it was
deemed there could be no property in the trade name or
trade-mark apart from the business in which it was used.
Such rule was followed by the federal Circuit Court of
0 where
Appeals in Time, Incorporatedv. Viobin Corporation"
defendant was engaged in selling a cereal product known as
"Life of Wheat" under a label in which the words "of Wheat"
were in considerably smaller type than the word "Life." The
label was also printed in white block lettering against a red
background so as to be similar to that used by plaintiff for
its magazine named "Life." Injunctive relief was denied on
the ground that no competition existed between plaintiff and
defendant.
78 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, Ch. 120, § 459.
79 DeLong Co. v. Hump Hairpin Co., 297 Ill. 359, 130 N.E. 765 (1921); Nestor
Johnson MIfg. Co. v. Alfred Johnson Skate Co., 313 Ill. 106, 144 N.E. 787 (1924).
80 128 F. (2d) 860 (1942), cert. den. 317 U.S. 673, 63 S. Ct. 78, 87 L. Ed. 50 (1942).
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Shortly thereafter the Illinois Appellate Court, in Lady
Esther, Limited v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Incorporated,8 pointed out that the earlier Illinois cases had all involved situations where competition was in fact present so
that, to warrant relief, an actual "palming off" was necessary. But such holdings, the court said, were far from saying
that the courts would not grant injunctive relief where "the
defendant's conduct is likely to cause confusion of the traders, so that the public believes or is likely to believe that
the goods of the defendant are the goods of the plaintiff or
that the plaintiff is in some way connected with or is a sponsor for the defendant. 8' 2 It accordingly granted plaintiff an
injunction against defendant's use of the name "Lady
Esther," saying that it was clear that the public might be
deceived into thinking there was some connection between
the parties. The fact that defendant had obtained a corporate charter authorizing the use of the name involved was
held to be no defence.
The case seems to mark a departure in the Illinois law
and one which seems well taken.8 3 Its consideration of the
position of the buying public is certainly realistic. If the
public is deceived by unfair practices, it is scarcely an answer to say that, since competition is absent, the deceit may
continue.
VIII. TORTS

A grist of torts cases pass through the judicial mill every
year, but few of them involve issues of real importance, since
most turn upon disputed questions of fact. From the purely
academic standpoint, however, the case of Illinois Minerals
Company v. McCarty' is worthy of note. In that case a confidential employee copied a list of the employer's customers
without the employer's consent. Suit to recover damages in
317 Il. App. 451, 46 N.E. (2d) 165 (1943).
317 Ill.
App. 451 at 455, 46 N.E. (2d) 165 at 168.
83 By reason of the doctrine in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct.
817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938), the Illinois law would be applicable to suits for unfair
competition. It was so recognized in the case of Time, Inc., v. Viobin. Had the
decision in the Lady Esther case preceded the federal case, the Circuit Court of
Appeals might have remanded that case for a determination of the effect of
defendant's practices on the buying public.
1 318 IL App. 423, 48 N.E. (2d) 424 (1943).
81
82
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trover was denied, since the defendant was held not to have
committed an act of conversion. The case adheres strictly
to the common law principle that only tangible personal
property can be converted. Notice might also be made of
Johnson v. Turner 2 wherein the issue of imputed negligence
was raised but was held inapplicable since, before it can
apply, the relationship of master and servant or principal
and agent must exist. As the party involved was a minor,
hence unable to make a binding contract essential for such
relationship, the doctrine of imputed negligence could
scarcely apply.'
Proximate causation was the principal question in Merlo
v. Public Service Company of Northern Illinois,4 and required the court to draw distinctions between cause and condition. The utility was found not to be the cause of the injury
even though it had negligently permitted live wires, insufficiently insulated, to sag so that contact could be made therewith by a negligently operated crane. The question, however,
is by no means new and, in the last analysis, is one of
"efficiency."
Another case of some significance is Ryan v. Chicago &
Northwestern Railway Company5 in which a police officer,
pursuing a culprit on a railroad right of way, was held to be
rightfully upon the premises and entitled to defendant's performance of a duty to exercise reasonable care to refrain
from injuring him. The officer was certainly not a trespasser
as his duty required him to enter the premises. As a licensee,
he would heretofore have recovered only had he shown that
his injury was produced by defendant's wanton conduct.' It
is not clear whether the court is creating a new class of persons who, by reason of their entrance upon another's property acquire different rights than heretofore, or whether the
conduct of the defendant's agents in the instant case is being
319 Il. App. 265, 49 N.E. (2d) 297 (1943).
s On this point see also the discussion of Palmer v. Miller, 380 Ill. 256, 43 N.E.
(2d) 973 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 195, 31 Ill. B.J. 355.
and also noted ante, p. 45.
4 381 Ill. 300, 45 N.E. (2d) 665 (1943), modifying 313 Ill. App. 57, 38 N.E. (2d)
986 (1942), noted in 37 Ill. L. Rev. 429.
5 315 Ill. App. 65, 42 N.E. (2d) 128 (1942), noted in 28 Cornell L.Q. 232, 31 Ill.
B.J. 258.
6 Casey v. Adams, 234 Ill. 350, 84 N.E. 933 (1908).
2

76
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assimilated to an active form of negligence akin to wantonness. If the former, the old classification between trespassers, licensees, and invitees must now open up to add a fourth
group. If the latter, it would seem that police officers and
firemen hereafter are no more likely to recover for an inactive negligent condition of the premises which causes injury than was heretofore the case.

